Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Dissertations

Dissertations

8-2011

Does Money Matter? Investigating the Financing of
Emerging Firms
Casey Frid
Clemson University, cj.frid@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons
Recommended Citation
Frid, Casey, "Does Money Matter? Investigating the Financing of Emerging Firms" (2011). All Dissertations. 772.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/772

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

DOES MONEY MATTER? INVESTIGATING THE
FINANCING OF EMERGING FIRMS

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Policy Studies

by
Casey Jonathan Frid
August 2011

Accepted by:
Dr. William B. Gartner, Committee Chair
Dr. Larry Plummer
Dr. John C. Alexander, Jr.
Dr. William J. Haller

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I investigate start-up financing by nascent entrepreneurs in the
United States between 2005 and 2010. By nascent entrepreneur, I mean individuals who
are in the process of creating a new business, but the business itself is not yet affecting
prices and quantities in the market. Nearly all research on financing has focused on
established firms. Little work, however, has been done on how entrepreneurs acquire and
use financial resources during the earliest stages of the firm creation process. The
availability of financial resources has been linked to firm growth and survivability, and
understanding how entrepreneurs use and acquire money is critical to understanding new
firm creation.
Two theories on entrepreneurial risk, introduced by Joseph Schumpeter and Frank
Knight, frame this study. These theories offer differing explanations as to who bears the
risks of entrepreneurship – whether it is borne by those providing financial capital, or by
the entrepreneurs themselves. I address this difference by examining the financing
behavior nascent entrepreneurs. Specifically, I introduce three groups of nascent
entrepreneurs, categorized by the amount of financial resources used and acquired to
create a new venture. The three groups are non-financers who use $0 - $500; averagefinancers who use an amount near the mean of $24,077; and macro-financers who use
$230,000 - $27.5 million. Chapter 1 looks at whether the amount of money affects the
likelihood of nascent entrepreneurs starting a new firm, or disengaging from the process.
Chapter 2 investigates the sources of start-up financing, and whether nascent
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entrepreneurs bear the risks of entrepreneurship. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the two
outlier groups of nascent entrepreneurs – non-financers and macro-financers.
Results indicate that nascent entrepreneurs do bear the initial risks of
entrepreneurship, before external financiers participate in the start-up process. Over 90%
of individuals starting businesses in the U.S. use personal savings to finance their nascent
ventures. Financing from external-formal sources, such as banks, is more likely to be
acquired later in the process. Contrary to findings from many studies on start-up
financing, I find that personal characteristics of the entrepreneur (e.g., sex, race,
educational attainment, and experience) do affect the likelihood of acquiring both formal
and informal sources.
Interestingly, macro-financers and non-financers start new firms at roughly the
same rate, yet there is no standard type of firm created by each group. Nascent
entrepreneurs within these groups have varying levels of experience, come from varying
demographics, and start different types of firms using different types of resources. My
investigation into these two outlier groups reveals that while traditional Knightian views
on risk and uncertainty are supported, the risks of entrepreneurship may have as much to
do with matching the right resources to the right opportunity as they do with calculating
risk between entrepreneurs and financiers.
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CHAPTER ONE
DOES MONEY MATTER FOR GETTING INTO BUSINESS?

Introduction
I often invite local entrepreneurs to share their experiences with the university
students enrolled in my entrepreneurship courses. The following is a recent interaction
between one student and a local entrepreneur, Devin, who owns and operates a highly
successful transmission repair shop.

Devin:

“How much money does it take to start a business?”

Student: “Well, we learned that, on average, people spend between five and
twenty-five thousand dollars of their own money.”
Devin:

“Wrong. The answer is all of it. Five to twenty-five thousand just
happens to be the amount that „all of it‟ is for most people.”

Devin raises an important issue. Much of what we teach on the topic of start-up
financing falls into two stereotypes. On the one hand is the idea that the entrepreneur
must have “skin in the game” – that is, the individual or team starting the business must
contribute a significant amount of personal money toward the creation of the new
venture. The act of making personal, financial contributions signals to outsiders (e.g.,
investors, future partners, and potential suppliers) that the entrepreneur is confident in his
or her abilities. It also demonstrates that the entrepreneur is willing to assume part of the
risk while developing the venture. This is important since the entrepreneur, presumably,
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understands best how to mobilize the necessary resources to transform the opportunity
into a financial sustainable new firm.
On the other hand is the “friends, family, and fools” stereotype of start-up
financing. This assumes that the entrepreneur acquires most funds externally. Friends and
family are those individuals that have developed a personal relationship with the
entrepreneur and are likely to interact frequently. Banks, angel investors, venture
capitalists, and others are the “fools” that invest their money in spite of significant
information asymmetries. For example, an outside investor may be convinced to finance
a business idea in an attractive industry, despite the risk of inaccurately assessing the
entrepreneur‟s skills and motivations.
Underlying both stereotypes is issue of who should bear the risk in
entrepreneurship. In academic research, the idea of the entrepreneur accepting full
responsibility for her efforts, and bearing all the risk in the process, stretches back to 18th
century France with Richard Cantillion‟s Essai on the role of the entrepreneur in the
economy (Hébert, 1985). In 1921, American economist Frank Knight reintroduced the
principal of entrepreneur as risk-bearer in his book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Hébert
& Link, 2009). Knight first differentiates between risk – situations where a market exists
and the “unknowns” are probabilities known to all; and uncertainty – situations where no
market exists, the unknowns are not known, and probabilities cannot be calculated
(1921). Risk, therefore, is information available to all parties involved. The role of the
entrepreneur is to shoulder the uncertainty so that outside investors don‟t have to.
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The narrative of entrepreneur as risk-bearer is elaborated on in later research.
Knight explicitly outlines the functions of the entrepreneur, stating that the he or she
should lead through innovation, forecast and adapt to changes, and that “…as owner of
any enterprise, [place] himself in the position to take the consequences of such
changes...[and] in this regard, the entrepreneur is simply a specialist in risk-taking or
uncertainty bearing...” (1942). This view is directly informed by probability theory.
Successful entrepreneurship will depend on whether individuals with unique skills and
abilities can act on probability estimates that are clearer to themselves than to others
(Miller, 2007).
The entrepreneur, therefore, has all of the information, or at least most of it. The
external financier trying to decide whether to fund the entrepreneur cannot calculate all of
the risks involved in starting the venture. It is for this reason that personal financial
contributions made by the entrepreneur are so important. They signal outside investors
that the individual starting the business is willing to lose something as well.
But not all scholars agree that the entrepreneur alone bears the risk. For Austrian
economist Joseph Schumpeter, the role of the financier and the role of the entrepreneur
are completely distinct. The entrepreneur is solely responsible for innovation and
technological changes; earning profits by introducing into the economy new
combinations of products, means of production, or new markets (Hébert & Link, 2009;
Schumpeter, 1934). Schumpeter is explicit in his view on the entrepreneur as risk-bearer
and attacks the notion throughout his career (Kanbur, 1980). In The Theory of Economic
Development, he says (page 137), “The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer”
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(Schumpeter, 1934). Rather, it is the capitalist (financier) who bears the risk since he or
she stands to lose the financial resource should the entrepreneur fail. Even if an
entrepreneur self-finances and subsequently fails to create a new firm, the entrepreneur
fails as a capitalist, not as an innovator (Schumpeter, 1954). The friends, family, and
fools narrative is therefore rooted in the assumption that the entrepreneur transfers the
risk to those financing the venture.

Research Questions
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the financing of emerging firms from
the perspective of the nascent entrepreneur. An emerging firm is defined as the sum of
the actions taken by an individual to start a business, but the business itself is not yet
operational. The successful outcome from these actions is an up-and-running business.
The nascent entrepreneur is the individual acting to create the new business.
Studying entrepreneurial financing in the context of nascent entrepreneurship is
important from a theoretical standpoint. Ultimately, theories on risk reflect differing
views on the role of the entrepreneur in the economy (Iversen, Jørgensen, & MalchowMller, 2007). In the previous section I outlined Knightian and Schumpeterian views –
Knight‟s entrepreneur is a business owner that shields external stakeholders from risk,
while Schumpeter‟s entrepreneur is an innovator that creates unique combinations of
resources. Studies that measure entrepreneurship as self-employment, as having acquired
a business license, or as having legally registered the business (e.g., as a soleproprietorship, partnership, or corporation), will only capture the Knightian aspect of risk
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as these stock measures do not take into account the overall flow of entrepreneurial
activity (2007). Inferences on Schumpeterian entrepreneurship require a more nuanced
look at other actions performed during the venture creation process, such as raising
money, marketing efforts, or writing a business plan.
The context of nascent entrepreneurship is important for empirical considerations
as well. Traditionally, studies on firm financing have analyzed large corporations, IPOs,
or firms that are well-established and actively participating in the economy. These studies
generally examine financing as debt versus equity and how debt structuring can reduce
agency costs, or be used as a strategic tool in product markets (Milton & Raviv, 1991).
Debts, for example, can be issued in exchange for stock. This reduces information
asymmetries between managers and shareholders by compelling managers to pay out
cash flows more predictably. A related body of literature has focused on the capital
structure and financing choices of small firms. These studies examine differences
between large and small firm financing, financial bootstrapping, and whether
characteristics of the entrepreneur affect financial decision making. Whether researching
the acquisition of financial capital by large firms, or by smaller firms, scholars have
almost exclusively relied on samples of established, successful businesses (Åstebro &
Bernhardt, 2003; Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds, 1995; Ou & Haynes, 2006; Verheul &
Thurik, 2001).
However, how nascent entrepreneurs acquire financial resources during the
earliest stages of the start-up process is a topic largely untouched by scholars. Reynolds
(2007) and Reynolds and Curtin (2007a) offer some insight into the broad characteristics
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of nascent venture finance (e.g., amounts invested by individuals and teams), but these
studies have not closely examined potential determinants of the types of financing
acquired by nascent ventures, nor whether the source and amount of financing are
correlated with the success or failure of a nascent venture.
Whether money matters for getting into business is the question of primary
concern in this dissertation. The current chapter addresses this question in the theoretical
context of the nature of risk. Chapter 2 empirically examines the early acquisition of
financial resources to determine whether it is the entrepreneur, or the financier, who bears
the risks of entrepreneurship.

Research Question One: Does money matter for getting into business?

Research Question Two: Do nascent entrepreneurs follow a specific pattern when
acquiring certain sources of funds?

A secondary goal of this dissertation is to develop a more comprehensive
overview of nascent financing that moves beyond theories of entrepreneurial risk.
Traditionally, studies formalizing Knight‟s “entrepreneur as risk-bearer” theory have
treated the topic as a choice where risk averse individuals select wage jobs, and risk
takers select entrepreneurship (Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979). However, this assumes that
risk is endogenous to the entrepreneur and contingent on the amount of personal wealth.
Wealthy individuals, under this assumption, are much more likely to become
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entrepreneurs. Recent interpretations of Knight that recognize exogenous risks involved
with entrepreneurship conclude that resource-rich individuals are actually at greater risk
when starting a business then resource-poor (Newman, 2007). For a resource-poor
entrepreneur, a small change in resources will offset the cost of the effort to acquire them;
but for the resource-rich, gains in resources must be significant to justify the effort
(2007).
In Chapters 3 and 4, I investigate two extremes of nascent entrepreneur financing
behavior: non-financers (nascent entrepreneurs that use little to no money to finance their
start-up), and macro-financers (nascent entrepreneurs that use large amounts of money).
Investigating these groups separately facilitates the incorporation of resource-based
perspectives into the analysis of nascent financing. An entrepreneur may start with few
resources, yet create a large corporation (e.g., Apple, Sierra On-Line, Whole Foods).
Others may possess an abundance of resources, but liabilities associated with large
resource endowments (e.g., reduced incentive to experiment, core rigidities) may inhibit
growth (Mosakowski, 2002). From this perspective, risk is not about winning or losing,
but whether the entrepreneur is able to match the resources in possession to the
opportunity (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985).
Furthermore, interest in “high-impact” entrepreneurs (i.e., those who start
businesses that contribute significantly to job creation and GDP), has risen considerably
in the past decade among both researchers and policymakers. Nascent entrepreneurs
using a lot of money may be pursuing higher quality opportunities. The likelihood of high
performance in the future may be higher as well. Given the interest in high-impact
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entrepreneurship, and my goal of providing a more detailed look at nascent financing,
Chapters 3 and 4 address the following research questions:

Research Question Three: Do macro-financing entrepreneurs exhibit specific
characteristics compared to non-financers or average-financers?

Research Question Four: Do non-financing entrepreneurs succeed at creating
new firms, and if so, what do they look like?

Figure 1.1 is a stylized depiction of the amount of money acquired by nascent
entrepreneurs in the United States between 2005 and 2010. The data is from the Panel
Studies of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (PSED II) – a nationally representative sample of
adults in the United States who, between 2005 and 2010, were actively involved in
starting a business. Non-financers make up 20% of all nascent entrepreneurs, and use
between $0 and $500. On the other extreme are the macro-financers that make up 5% of
all nascent entrepreneurs and use vast amounts of money ($230,000 - $27.5 million).
Those remaining are average-financers that use amounts relatively close to the median,
which is $8,500. Figure 1.1 is also an outline of this dissertation.
The actual distribution of nascent financing is actually highly skewed, with the
majority of financing by nascent entrepreneurs occurring near the median and one in five
use $500 or less. The macro-financers reside in a long tail. Figure 1.2 depicts the actual
distribution of nascent financing in the U.S.
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Non-financers
$0 - $500
212 firms
(20th percentile)

Macro-financers
$230,000 - $27.5 million
51 firms
(95th percentile)

Graphic Representation of the Distribution of Nascent Venture Financing
in the United States from 2005 – 2010.
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Figure 1.1 :
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Figure 1.2 :

Actual Distribution of Nascent Venture Financing in the United States
from 2005 – 2010, Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (truncated
at $500,000).
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Dissertation Sample
Appendix A provides a detailed overview of the PSED research program. The
principal objective of the PSED research program is to provide a comprehensive
description of the business creation process (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). The PSED II is a
representative, longitudinal sample of 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs in the United States.
As of this writing five waves of data have been collected in 12-month intervals from
2005 to 2010.
Identification of the nascent entrepreneurs began with a screening process of
31,845 individuals. These individuals were contacted via a random digit dialing
procedure between October, 2005 and January, 2006. Respondents answering “yes” to
any of the following three questions were allowed to continue the screening process:



“Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including
any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?”



“Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a new
venture for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work?”



“Are you, alone or with others, currently the owner of a business you help
manage, including self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?”

Finally, to be identified as a nascent entrepreneur, respondents had to meet each
of the following criteria: (1) taken action in the past twelve months to start a business; (2)
will personally own all or part of the business; (3) have not received any money, income,
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or fees for more than six of the past twelve months – or, if the business has received
money, revenue cannot have exceeded expenses for more than six of the past twelve
months; (4) monthly expenses cannot have included salaries or wages for the owners
active in managing the business for more than six of the past twelve months.
Detailed interviews on the 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs were conducted by the
University of Michigan‟s Institute for Social Research. Wave A interviews were
completed as respondents were identified in the screener, and completed in January,
2006. Waves B, C, D, and E were completed at 12-months, 24-months, 36-months, and
48-months out, respectively (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007a).

PSED II Outcome Measures, Finance Measures, and Finance Categories
Outcome Measures in the PSED II
The nascent entrepreneurs‟ actions result in one of three potential outcomes: (1) a
new firm; (2) disengagement from the process; or (3) continuation of the start-up effort.
In the PSED II, “A new firm is defined as an independent commercial actor in the
economy, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded in the market” (Reynolds &
Curtin, 2008). For the respondent‟s efforts to be considered a new firm, the following
three conditions must be met: (1) the business must have received money from sales for
more than six of the past twelve months; (2) monthly revenue must have been more than
monthly expenses for more than six of the past twelve months; and (3) salaries or wages
of the owners had to have been included in the monthly expenses for more than six of the
past twelve months.
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If the respondent indicates he or she has disengaged from the original business
effort, then the final outcome is “disengaged”. If by Wave E the respondent has not
disengaged or met the criteria for a new firm, the final outcome is “still trying”. In order
to be categorized as “still trying”, the respondent must indicate that the business start-up
is going to be a major career focus for the next twelve months; or have devoted more than
160 hours to the start-up during the past twelve months.
Many research programs exist that explore different aspects of entrepreneurship.
The PSED II fills a critical gap because it provides substantial detail on the start-up
process, is a representative sample, includes many independent variables, and tracks
nascent entrepreneurs from conception of the business idea until the early years of a new
firm (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007b). It is the only dataset of its kind in existence. For
comparison, the following is a review of two common operational measures of
entrepreneurship by Reynolds and Curtin (2007b):

Self-employment. In the monthly current population survey, self-employed
are those that meet a very narrow definition (U.S. Department of Commerce,
2002), “… those who work for profit or fees in their own business, professions,
trades, or farms. Only the unincorporated self-employed are include in the selfemployed category since those whose businesses are incorporated are technically
are wage and salary workers because they are paid employees of a corporation”.
Those managers of business they own will be classified as “salaried
administrators” working for their own business. It is not clear how two or more
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persons that have formed a legal partnership would be treated in this classification
scheme. About 80% of nascent entrepreneurs have a full-time or part-time job or
are managing another business while they work on developing a new business.
They will never be identified with a procedure that focuses solely on current labor
force activity. Second, as discussed below, the median time to reach a resolution
of the start-up process is about two years. Behavior identified in a single month
does not provide a good representation of the extent of efforts to create new firms.
Comprehensive firm registries. There are two federally sponsored efforts
to maintain a complete census of employee establishments…The first reflects
state unemployment insurance filings and is organized at the national level by the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The other reflects a combination of social security
payments coordination with tax returns received by the Internal Revenue Service
administered by the U.S. Census. A third nationally comprehensive business
census is represented in a commercial credit rating program, organized as the
Dun‟s Market Identifier file [DMI] by Dun and Bradstreet…these studies provide
data on only a narrow part of the phenomena [although they do provide
information on the rate of new firms entering the economy]. None provide
systematic accounts on the earliest stage of the firm creation process, before the
initiative is operational and is added to any type of business registry.

To reiterate a point made in the “Research Questions” section earlier in this
chapter: the conceptual and operational definition of nascent entrepreneurship in the
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PSED II is particularly suited to the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation.
Theoretical measures of entrepreneurial risk ultimately reflect different ideas on the role
of the entrepreneur in the economy. Studies rooted in Schumpeterian entrepreneurship
view the entrepreneur as an innovator or agent of change, while the Knightian
entrepreneur is the residual claimant who insures all external stakeholders (Iversen, et al.,
2007). Most entrepreneurship studies use datasets that implicitly define entrepreneurship
as whether the individual has applied for a business license, or has legally registered the
business as a sole-proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. Nascent entrepreneurs,
however, are defined by the sum of all actions taken to start a business. Actions may
include raising money, creating a business plan, marketing, or making a sale. The PSED
II allows for inferences on both Knightian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, as it
includes measures of entrepreneurial stock, and flow over time (2007).

Finance Measures
This section describes the financing variables in the PSED II questionnaire. These
form the basis of the analyses throughout this dissertation. Sections Q and R from the
PSED II questionnaire contain items related to the sources of funding acquired by
respondents. Certain types of funding require that the business be formally established by
registering with an appropriate government agency. Section Q covers funding sources
acquired before registration. Section R covers funding sources acquired after registration.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 list the items from sections Q and R in the PSED II questionnaire.
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Variable
|
Source of Funding
Number
|
(before business registration)
-------------+------------------------------------------Q4
|
Personal Savings
Q5
|
Family loans
Q6
|
Friends, employers, work colleagues
Q7
|
Credit card loans
Q8
|
Bank loan
Q9
|
Asset backed loan (2nd mortgage, car)
Q10
|
Other
Q12x
|
Total from all sources (Q4-Q10)
Table 1.1 : Funding Sources in PSED II Questionnaire, Before Business Legally
Registered.
Variable
|
Source of Funding
Number
|
(after business registration)
-------------+------------------------------------------R6
|
Asset backed debts
R7
|
Leases on property and equipment
R8
|
Bank line of credit, working capital
R9
|
Supplier credit
R10
|
Personal loans (post registration)
R11
|
Loans from start-up team
R12
|
Spouses, family, next of kin
R13
|
Employees who do not own the startup
R14
|
Personal loans from other individuals
R15
|
Credit card
R16
|
Bank loans
R17
|
Venture Capital
R18
|
Government agency (non-SBA)
R19
|
SBA guaranteed bank loans
R20
|
Other
R21x
|
Total from all sources (R6-R20)
Table 1.2 : Funding Sources in PSED II Questionnaire, After Business Legally
Registered.
In Wave A, respondents are asked, “What is the dollar amount provided by
(you/[Name]) that came from [funding source]?” In waves B – E, for each source,
respondents are asked to confirm the amounts given in the last interview before being
asked, “What is the total dollar amount provided by (you/[Name]) that came from
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[funding source] (including the amount you reported last year)?” Therefore, the total
amount of each source acquired by a respondent will be equal to the amount given at the
wave that corresponds to the respondent‟s final interview.
I am only interested in the total amount of financing acquired up until the
respondent (a) starts a new firm, (b) disengages from the start-up process, or (c) is still
trying to start a business by the final wave of data collection. In the PSED II, respondents
who have successfully started a new firm are still followed all the way through to Wave
E. For respondents who start a new firm before this point, I stop calculating the amount
of financing acquired the moment they start a new business.

Categories of Financers
Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 depict three cases from the PSED II data set, selected at
random, from each of the three categories of financer (non-financer, average-financer,
and macro-financer). These cases should not be interpreted as being representative of the
nascent entrepreneurs within each group. They do, however, reveal some of the
information available in the dataset – variables I use throughout this dissertation.
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ENTREPRENEUR A – “THE NON-FINANCER”
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Male, Caucasian, age 40-44, married. As of 2005, unemployed with high
school education and renting a dwelling in a center city of a
metropolitan area in the Pacific census division. Has 6 years
experience in his
start-up’s industry, and no prior start-up
experience.
Net income:
Net worth:

$57,000
-$63,000

THE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
Entrepreneur A is starting a reupholstery and furniture repair
business. He wants to start the business because he has talent in the
field, and passion for the work. The opportunities that prompted him to
start the business are an untapped market, and high demand for the
service. The main problems he is running into are acquiring financing,
and equipment costs. He never wrote a business plan. He first started
thinking about starting the business in March, 2005, and has devoted
1,000 hours to the new business.
TOTAL FINANCING:
OUTCOME:

$500 from personal savings.
NEW FIRM established 2010.

Figure 1.3 : Portrait of a “Non-Financer”.
ENTREPRENEUR B – “THE AVERAGE-FINANCER”
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Female, Caucasian, age 45-49, married. As of 2005, working part time
with a postgraduate degree and owning a dwelling in the Northeast,
Middle Atlantic census division. Lives outside a city, but in a county
adjacent to a city. Has 17 years experience in her start-up’s industry,
and has never started a company before.
Net income:
Net worth:

$87,000
$514,000

THE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
Entrepreneur B is starting a computer systems and design service
business. She wants to start the business to have another job and she
describes the opportunity as stemming from an untapped market. The main
problems she faces are acquiring information on the target market, and
acquiring financing. She registered
the company as
a General
Corporation and has also prepared a business plan. She first started
thinking about the business in September, 2003, and has devoted 400
hours to the new business.
TOTAL FINANCING:
OUTCOME:

$31,200 ($1,000 personal savings; $5,000 from family
members; $23,000 bank line of credit; $2,200 from
credit card).
NEW FIRM established 2009.

Figure 1.4 : Portrait of an “Average-Financer”.
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ENTREPRENEUR C – “THE MACRO-FINANCER”
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Male, Caucasian, age 45-49, married. As of 2005, working full time with
a bachelor’s degree and owning a dwelling in the Pacific census
division. Lives outside a city, but in a county adjacent to a city. Has
25 years industry experience, and has never started a company before.
Net income:
Net worth:

$250,000
$2.15 million

THE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
Entrepreneur C is starting a custom computer programming business. He
wants to start the business for lifestyle reasons – specifically, to
try something new. He describes the opportunity as a new technology to
be introduced to the market, and the main problem as acquiring
information on the target market. He is working with 6 other team
members. The business is registered as a General Corporation. He has
not written a business plan. The business has developed proprietary
technology. He started thinking about the business idea in summer,
2002, and he’s devoted 500 hours to the business.
TOTAL FINANCING:
OUTCOME:

$13 million ($5 million from personal savings; $4
million from a bank loan; $4 million from an asset
backed loan likely a second mortgage.
DISENGAGED in 2008.

Figure 1.5 : Portrait of a “Macro-Financer”.

Literature Review on Firm Financing
In this section I present an overview of the research on firm financing. I devote
attention to the financing of small and young firms, from the perspective of the owner or
entrepreneur.

Acquisition of Financing
According to traditional theories of firm financing, individual‟s typically choose
funding that minimizes the costs (and maximizes the benefits) associated with different
sources of debt and equity (Modigliani & Merton, 1958; Titman & Wessels, 1988). For
example, owners and managers may select funding sources that allows them to transfer
risk, maintain control, or signal information asymmetries. Alternatively, they may search
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for the cheapest available funding while maintaining control of the business (Milton &
Raviv, 1991).
Individuals can also structure their financing to address agency conflicts within
the organization. Agency conflicts between shareholders and debt holders occur because
shareholders, as residual claimants, have incentive to increase the operating and financial
risk of the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since debt holders assume most of the
risk, owners take on riskier investments. To protect themselves debt holders may also
impose monitoring and contractual policies on firms, especially when the firm is privy to
valuable product and/or market information. This mitigates their concerns, but it also
increases the cost of capital for the firm (Cassar, 2004).
The pecking order model of capital structure directly addresses the information
asymmetries associated with agency conflicts. According to this theory, firms do not aim
for a target debt ratio. Rather, capital structure emerges as the firm selects from funding
sources that minimize the cost of capital (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Internal
sources of funding (e.g. retained earnings) are used first since information asymmetry
problems are non-existent. Debt is sought next, followed by outside equity. Individuals
seek outside equity last because the firm (presumably) has more information on itself
than the investor. The presence of significant information asymmetries causes the
investor to charge a higher rate of return on equity than on debt (Frank & Goyal, 2003).
Several studies have empirically tested these theories using samples of larger,
established firms and IPOs (Chirinko & Singha, 2000; Fama & French, 2002; Helwege &
Liang, 1996; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1994). These firms are more likely to use their
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capital structure for strategic purposes, or to maximize returns to shareholders. Owners
and managers of small firms and new ventures, however, differ considerably from these
larger firms and face different agency and information asymmetry challenges. The firms
under their charge are not likely to be publically traded or incorporated, which limits the
sources of financing available to them. Also, because they are not required to share as
much information as publically traded companies, these firms are information opaque.
This can result in high agency costs and information asymmetries. These individuals
must therefore depend heavily on reputation building through repeated transactions, and
on personal reputation, rather than capital structure considerations (Ang, 1991). Also, the
financing decisions faced by the owners of small and new ventures are more complex.
These decisions may be closely linked to the individual‟s wealth or social contacts.
Business risk and personal risk are one and the same, if the firm is a sole-proprietorship.
Consequentially, agency problems may be more intense as shareholders and partners are
often made up of family and friends (Ang, 1992). The tools available for securing debt
financing differ as well. Collateral for bank lines of credit and loans, personal guarantees,
relationship lending, and shorter maturities on debt contracts to shield lenders from
shifting risk profiles all serve to diminish the high information asymmetries between
owners of new ventures and lenders (Berger & Udell, 2003).
To offset or avoid these complications, small-business owners often employ
financial bootstrapping strategies. Financial bootstrapping is a method of meeting
financial resource needs without resorting to sources of external financing (e.g., delaying
payment to suppliers, borrowing equipment, or sharing office space) (Winborg &
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Landström, 2001). Winborg and Landström‟s (2001) seminal study categorizes a sample
of 900 Swedish small business managers into six categories: non-bootstrappers; delayers
who delay payments to preserve cash-on-hand; owner-financers who rely on personal and
family funds; minimizers who reduce accounts receivable and inventory as much as
possible; relationship-oriented who depend on social networks; and subsidy-oriented who
use government money to reduce financial cost and consists of high-growth, highpotential firms. Each of these categories sheds light onto how small-business owners
finance themselves.
Financial bootstrapping has been tested in the contexts of both industry and the
lifecycle of the firm. Owners of technology-based firms place more importance on
bootstrapping techniques that improve cash flows, compared to nontechnology-based
firms (e.g. terminating agreements with late payers, using credit cards, charging interest
on overdue accounts, and borrowing equipment) (Auken, 2005). Higher information
asymmetries between the owners of technology-based firms and investors may make
these investments riskier, which pushes the owners of these ventures to work harder for
capital and preserve cash-flow (2005). Also, bootstrapping strategies may differ
depending on the age of the firm. Owners of early stage firms may rely more on owner
relationship-oriented techniques, while owners of more developed firms depend on
customer-related techniques, such as the negotiation of payment terms (Ebben &
Johnson, 2006).
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Sources of Financing
Sources of firm financing are generally categorized as either “debt vs. equity” or
“internal vs. external” (Cassar, 2004; Chaganti, et al., 1995; Fluck, 1998; Scherr, Sugrue,
& Ward, 1993). While both categorizations may provide meaningful insights into the
financing of established firms, financing acquired by nascent entrepreneurs more likely
resembles the “internal vs. external” categorization. If internal suppliers of financing
include individuals with a personal relationship to the entrepreneur, then most funding for
small firms in the U.S. seems to come from insiders (i.e., the entrepreneur, the start-up
team, family, and friends) (Berger & Udell, 1998). When outside investors do get
involved, they pay close attention to the creditworthiness and reputation of the
entrepreneur. For this reason, owners of young firms and low quality firms are more
likely to depend on internal equity compared with older, high quality firms that are better
able to attract external equity (Ou & Haynes, 2006). For nascent entrepreneurs starting
innovative, high-potential ventures, patents and prototypes may be used as signals.
Audretsch et al. (2009) use a cross-sectional sample of 906 nascent entrepreneurs who are
actively seeking angel or venture capital financing. Their results indicate that patents and
prototypes do increase the probability of acquiring external equity financing, but the
effect is significant only when both occur together. They suggest that outside investors
may view prototypes as signals of a tangible outcome (decreasing risk), and patents as
signals that will secure a future return on investment.
Fluck et al. categorize financing according to source, and not contractual
obligations such as debt and equity (1998). Using a sample of 541 entrepreneurial firms
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in Wisconsin, they group financing sources into insiders (the entrepreneur, start-up team,
friends, family, and business associates); outsiders who monitor the firm closely (banks,
venture capitalists, private investors); stockholders; and bond holder. Their findings
suggest that as the firm ages, the proportion of money from insiders increases early on
until external investments begin to take over.
Cassar (2004) examines start-up financing early in the venture creation process.
Using the 1996-1998 Business Longitudinal Survey by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics, entrepreneurs are asked about amounts of debt and equity they carried within
12 months of appearing on tax registers. The study‟s findings suggest that characteristics
of the entrepreneur do not affect capital structure choice, once firm characteristics are
considered. Larger firms seem more likely to use bank or other external financing, and
firms with fewer tangible assets are financed informally compared to firms with greater
tangible assets.
One of the key aspects of Cassar‟s study is that by capturing firms at such an early
stage, survivorship bias is significantly reduced. However, the firms in the Australian
sample are not true nascent ventures in the process of being created. Indeed, the sample
includes firms that may employ up to 200 employees. And, while the scope of the survey
encompasses most of the Australian economy, it does not include: (1) non-employing
businesses; (2) government enterprises; or (3) business classified as agricultural, utilities,
communication services, education, or health and community services (Australian Bureau
of Statistics, 2000).
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Financing by Nascent Entrepreneurs
Since the vast majority of studies on start-up financing do not use samples of
nascent entrepreneurs, there is a theoretical gap concerning whether financing relates to a
nascent entrepreneur‟s success. Faced with this dearth of information, a stylized view of
the facts, focusing on descriptive statistics, is a good point of departure for exploring
theory and models (Boland, 2008; Kaldor, 1957). A number of recent studies address
financing in this manner. Utilizing the Kauffman Firm Survey, a sample of 4,928 U.S.
firms founded in 2004, Robb and Robinson find that: new firms have an average of
$109,000 in financial capital with half coming from external sources; new firms depend
more on formal, external debt (e.g., bank loans, credit lines, and owner-backed loans); on
average, bank financing is seven times that of debt acquired internally, and levels of
external debt compared to internal were high even for the smallest of firms; outside
equity is acquired by 0.05% of the sample, and inside equity from family members by 5%
(2010). The Kauffman Firm Survey is a random sample of Dun & Bradstreet listed firms,
with an oversampling of high-tech firms based on the level of employment in research
and development (Ballou et al., 2008). In the Robb and Robinson study, 36% of firms
were sole proprietorships and 58% were incorporated; 50% were home-based; 24.5% had
some form of intellectual property; 60% had no employees other than the founder (2010).
Other studies link financing to firm characteristics. For small businesses, firm
leverage has been found to be negatively related to firm size, age, and credit quality; and
positively related to the amount of physical assets (Cole, 2011). There is no apparent
relation between firm leverage and race, though female-owned firms tend to use less
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leverage (2011). Two studies based on the PSED II reveal interesting findings linking
financing to entrepreneur characteristics, and firm survival. During the nascent stage,
while only 12% of non-owner founders provide financial resources, initial financial
endowments, along with relevant work experience, lowers the risk of failure (Yang &
Aldrich, 2011). Reynolds (2011) categorized financing into formal and informal sources,
and finds that the average amount of informal support (funding acquired before being
legally registered with a government agency) is $48,000, and formal support (funding
acquired after legal registration) is $200,000. This study finds no relationship between
informal/formal financial support, and nascent venture survivability.

Hypotheses – Financing and Firm Outcomes
I now explore whether financing, in conjunction with characteristics of the
entrepreneur, firm, and industry, affect the final outcome of the individual‟s attempt to
start a new firm. Using theory from research on the sources of funding for new ventures
(Cassar, 2004; Gartner, Frid, & Alexander, In Press; Headd, 2003), I offer a set of
hypotheses about outcomes of the start-up process. I test these hypotheses using data
from the PSED II.
While financial capital is a crucial resource for the founding of a new venture, it is
just one of many factors that affect firm performance (Robb & Coleman, 2009). Large
amounts of financial capital, whether from external sources or from the entrepreneur‟s
personal savings, may signal the quality or market potential of the opportunity being
pursued – or at the very least it is a manifestation of the belief that the capital provider
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has in the business or the entrepreneur herself. Michaelas, et al. (1999) find that more
leverage and debt are positively relative to future growth. Cassar (2004) finds that future
growth is positively related to the use of bank financing. Financial capital can also serve
as a buffer against random shocks, as well as provide the entrepreneur with more
strategic options (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994). Both enhance the
survivability of a new venture.

Hypothesis 1: Nascent entrepreneurs using large amounts of money to finance
their nascent venture are less likely to disengage from the start-up process than
those that use average amounts, or no money at all.

Entrepreneurs starting larger firms have been linked to the survival and
performance of new firms. Geroski, et al. make a case for larger firms being more likely
to survive (2010), and large new ventures are more likely to benefit from scale economies
(Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994). Smaller companies have also been found to have higher
death rates, compared to larger firms, although growth rates seem to be poor predictors of
performance (Dunne & Hughes, 1994; Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009). Small-business
owners may also have a difficult time with high transaction costs associated with the
acquisition of resources such as formal funding or expensive equipment (Ang, 1992).
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Hypothesis 2: Nascent entrepreneurs that expect their firm to be larger are less
likely to disengage from the start-up process than those that expect their firm to
be smaller.

Many institutions consider incorporation to be a signal of credibility and
operational quality (Gartner, et al., In Press). Legal planning and the process of
incorporating a business has been found to better protect the assets of the business and
entrepreneur; and entrepreneurs are able to familiarize themselves with regulatory
regimes in the process (Malach, Robinson, & Radcliffe, 2006).

Hypothesis 3: Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their nascent ventures are
less likely to disengage from the start-up process than those that expect their firm
to be smaller.

A recent study of young Swedish firms has found that industry level matters little
for survival, and it matters even less for firms sales and sales growth (Short, McKelvie,
Ketchen, & Chandler, 2009). I surmise, however, that nascent entrepreneurs face more
complexity when attempting to start businesses in industries that are more asset intensive,
such as mining, manufacturing, and construction. Larger capital outlays are required early
in the venture creation process, compared to service industries such as consulting,
financial services, and consumer services (Gartner, et al., In Press).
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Hypothesis 4: Nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses in asset intensive
industries are less likely to disengage from the start-up process than nascent
entrepreneurs in service oriented industries.

Nascent entrepreneurs may benefit depending on their location. Concentrations of
people and businesses enable sharing of culture and resources, as well as provide access
to specialized knowledge (Plummer & Pe‟er, 2010). Firms located in strong clusters have
been linked to higher rates of survival and performance (Wennberg & Lindqvist, 2010).
Within metro areas, immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely succeed as they can draw on
immediately available social capital (Kalnins & Chung, 2006). Metro areas also afford
access to diverse resources often lacking in rural areas. Metro startups tend to fare better,
controlling for firm strategy and industry (Stearns, Carter, Reynolds, & Williams, 1995).

Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs in or near metro areas are less likely to
disengage from the start-up process than those that are in rural areas.

The personal characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs likely play a strong role in
signaling information to outsiders, as these individuals are unlikely to have gone through
a process of institutionalization (Kimberly, 1979). New ventures started by females
underperform ventures started by males in measures of size, profitability, and number of
employees hired (Robb & Coleman, 2009). Firms started by females also have lower
survival rates, compared to firms started by males (Fairlie & Robb, 2009).

28

Fairlie and Robb find that minority owned businesses tend to be smaller and less
successful – specifically they suffer lower sales and fewer employees, according to data
from the 2006 U.S. Census (2008). Edelman et al. (2010) find that motives differ among
minority businesses to grow, but not necessarily to start.
Education, industry experience, and involvement in prior start-ups may provide
entrepreneurs access to funding networks that may otherwise not be available, or signal
lower risk to outside investors (Gartner, et al., In Press). Van Der Sluis et al. find that
education is not important for selection into entrepreneurship, but it is positively related
to firm performance on the individual decides to act as an entrepreneur (2008). Robinson
and Sexton (1994) find that higher education also relates to higher performance. From a
legitimacy perspective, while industry experience may not be important, start-up
experience is related to higher performance (Delmar & Shane, 2004).
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that individuals do not use more than 1.5 times
their initial assets to start a new venture. In Thailand, financing seems to be a constraint wealthier households are more likely to start a business, and invest more, compared to
other households (Paulson & Townsend, 2004). Parker (2004) posits that high net worth
individuals are more likely to enter into entrepreneurship for reasons that are not yet
measureable (e.g. they may be “inherently acquisitive”).

Hypothesis 6a: Male entrepreneurs are less likely to disengage from the
start-up process than female nascent entrepreneurs.

29

Hypothesis 6b: Non-minority nascent entrepreneurs are less likely to
disengage from the start-up process than minority nascent entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 6c: Nascent entrepreneurs with higher education levels are
less likely to disengage from the start-up process than those that are less
educated.
Hypothesis 6d: Nascent entrepreneurs that have started successful
businesses in the past are less likely to disengage from the start-up process than
those who have no prior start-up experience.
Hypothesis 6e: Nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth are less
likely to disengage from the start-up process than those with a lower net worth.

Methodology
Sample
The PSED II, described earlier in this chapter, is used for this analysis. A key
feature of the PSED II is that it examines the actions of nascent entrepreneurs prior to the
formation of a new firm. Survivor bias is eliminated, and we can analyze both successful
and unsuccessful attempts to start a business.
Since I am primarily concerned with the creation of independent, new businesses,
I remove 213 observations from all analyses. These observations represent nascent
entrepreneurs engaged in other start-up opportunities. Item AA10 in the PSED II
questionnaire asks, “Would you describe this new business as an independent new
business created by an individual or a team working on its own, a purchase or takeover of

30

an existing business, a franchise, a multi-level marketing initiative, a new business
sponsored by an existing business, or something else?” I remove 37 purchases/takeovers
of existing businesses, 38 franchises, 55 multi-level marketing initiatives, and 83 new
businesses that are sponsored by existing businesses.
The final sample in this analysis is 1,001 independent, new businesses.

Dependent Variable
The outcome of the nascent entrepreneur‟s efforts to start a business is the
dependent variable for this analysis. Research on business outcomes has operationalized
the concept in a number of ways, each with its own drawbacks. Davidsson and Scott
(2011) describe nascent venture outcomes as including (a) the amount of progress made
based on actions taken; (b) the individual‟s self-reported status as either having started a
new firm, disengaged, or still trying; (c) objective measures such as occurrence of first
sales or positive cash flow, or continuous measures of sales and cash flow. The PSED II
incorporates both continuous, objective measures of sales and cash flow, as well as the
individual‟s self-reported status.
A “new firm” in the PSED II is defined as, “…an independent commercial actor
in the economy, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded in the market”
(Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). Specifically, a nascent entrepreneur is considered to have
succeeded if, during six of the previous twelve months, sales have been generated,
revenue has covered expenses, and wages or salaries have been paid to owners and
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managers. In addition to these three criteria, the respondent has to confirm that a new
firm has been created.
The dependent variable “OUTCOME” is categorical, and coded as “0” if the
nascent entrepreneur created a new firm; “1” if still trying as of 2010 (the final wave of
data collection); and “2” for disengagement.

Independent Variables
Level of Financing (FINANCE). FINANCE is a continuous variable representing
the log of total amount of financing acquired by the nascent entrepreneur between 2005
and 2010.
Firm Size (SIZE). Respondents are asked, “Which of the following two statements
best describes your preference for the future size of this new business: I want this new
business to be as large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a few key
employees?” SIZE is coded “0” if the individual wants it to be as large as possible; and
“1” for a size manageable by self or with key employees. Determining the size of a firm
at such an early stage presents difficulties. Traditional measures of firm size such as the
number of employees, or the amount of revenue, do not necessarily apply to nascent
ventures as the business is not yet operational. Therefore, the size expectation of the
nascent entrepreneur is used as a proxy, albeit an imperfect one.
Legal Status (LEGAL). Respondents are asked about the current legal form of the
new business. Dummy variables are created based on a categorical variable LEGAL,
coded “0” if the business is a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or limited
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partnership; “1” if a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Sub-chapter S Corporation or
general corporation; and “2” if the legal form has not been determined by the final wave
of data collection.
Industry (INDUSTRY). Respondents are asked to best describe the new business
based on a set of industry descriptions, which are based on NAICS codes. INDUSTRY is
coded as “0” for asset intensive industries (e.g., retail stores, restaurants, taverns, bars,
nightclubs, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, mining, wholesale distribution,
transportation, utilities, communications, and real estate); and “1” for service industries
(e.g., customer or customer service, health, education, social services, communications,
finance, insurance, and business consulting).
Metro Location (METRO). Based on the respondent‟s zip code and categorization
by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, METRO is coded as “0” if
the respondent lives in the center city of a metro area, inside a center city county, inside a
suburban county, or in a general metropolitan area; and “1” if living in a rural area.
Sex (SEX). SEX is coded as “0” for male; and “1” for female.
Race (RACE). RACE is coded as “0” for White/Caucasian; and “1” for
Black/African American, Asian/Asian American, and other races.
Education (EDU). EDU is a series of dummy variables based on a categorical
variable coded as “0” if the respondent completed at least a high school education; “1”
for some college, community college, or a technical or vocational degree; “2” for a
Bachelors degree; and “3” for some graduate school, a Masters degree, or for law, MD,
PhD, and EDD degrees.

33

Prior Start-up Experience (EXP). EXP is a series of dummy variables based on a
categorical variable coded as “0” if the respondent has no start-up experience; “1” for one
prior successful startup; “2” for two or more.
Net Worth (NETWORTH). NETWORTH is calculated from a series of questions
that determine the value of the individual‟s home(s), the amount still owed on any
mortgages, the amount of any non-home related debts, the amount of savings and
investments, and the value of any vehicles, jewelry, and other assets.
Time in Process (TIME). Data from the PSED II reveal a high level of variability
among respondents, specifically regarding the amount of time spent in the process of
creating a new venture. This “temporal heterogeneity” makes it difficult to ascertain
when, exactly, the process begins (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). Nascent entrepreneurs
do not form new ventures at the same rate, not even within the same industry. It is
possible that the longer an individual works on his or her business, the more the start-up
attempt will differ compared to others that started at the same time. For example, for each
month a new firm ages, the hazard of establishing itself as a legal entity decreases by
19% (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Also, nascent entrepreneurs that have worked on their
business longer than 12 months may be over represented in large, representative samples
as members of their initial cohort will have either started a new firm, or disengaged in the
same period (Gartner, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004; Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, &
Gartner, 2007). However, it also stands to reason that nascent entrepreneurs spend more
time working on businesses opportunities that are more complex, or in complex
industries. To account for this, TIME represents the number of months between the date
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the individual first started thinking about the business, and the date that the individual
either (a) started a new firm, or (b) disengaged from the process. For individuals still
trying during the final wave of data collection, I use (c) the date of the final interview.
The time in process, industry, and education variables address issues of sample
heterogeneity related to samples of nascent ventures (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011).

Design
Similar to Headd (2003) the categorical dependent variable, OUTCOME, is tested
using multinomial logistic regression. This model explains the effects of financing, and
firm and entrepreneur characteristics, on the likelihood of the successful creation of a
new firm. Logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship between the
dependent and independent variables. This is particularly important when looking at the
effects of human capital on performance, as prior studies have found linkages using
nonlinear specifications (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). Also, homogeneity of variances
within each category of the dependent variable is not necessary.
The analysis is conducted using population sample weights calculated from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights
based on the categorization of the dependent variable, and final sample size.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.3 shows the number of nascent entrepreneurs within each outcome
category (the dependent variable). The 102 missing values are part of a group of
respondents who, shortly after initial screening into the sample, were discovered to have
either immediately started a profitable firm, or were reactivating a dormant business. In
other words, these 102 individuals were not creating a new independent business, or they
were right at the cusp of the creation of a new firm and were captured just as it happened
(Reynolds & Curtin, 2007a). Overall, missing data rates in the PSED II sample are far
below the average of any survey of this kind (Reynolds & Curtin, 2009).
By the time Wave E interviews were completed in 2010, 14.4% of nascent
entrepreneurs had created a new firm, 48.3% had disengaged from the process, and
27.2% were still trying.

Outcome
|
Status
|
Freq.
Percent
Cum.
-------------+----------------------------------New Firm |
188
18.78
18.78
Still Trying |
272
27.17
45.95
Disengaged |
439
43.86
89.81
(Missing) |
102
10.19
100.00
-------------+----------------------------------Total |
1,001
100.00
Table 1.3 : Outcome status of independent, nascent ventures in the United States from
2005 –2010.
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Financing and Outcome Status
Table 1.4 depicts summary statistics for the total amount of financing acquired,
from all sources, by nascent entrepreneurs in the sample. The distribution is highly
skewed, with 25% of respondents acquiring less than $1,000. The median amount
acquired by all entrepreneurs is $5,540, and the average is $114,587. Also presented are
the four smallest observations ($0), and the four largest – the most money acquired by a
nascent venture in the PSED II is $27.5 million.

All Firms, Total Financing
----------------------------------------------------------Percentiles
Smallest
1%
0
0
5%
0
0
10%
0
0
Obs
1,001
25%
1,000
0
Sum of Wgt.
1,001
50%
75%
90%
95%
99%

5,450
23,750
80,000
200,000
1,993,000

Largest
5,040,000
6,100,000
13,000,000
27,500,000

Mean
Std. Dev.
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

114,587.2
1,151,437
1.33e+12
20.64128
471.9991

Table 1.4 : Summary Statistics for Total Amount of Financing Acquired by All Firms.

Table 1.5 shows the amount of financing used by outcome status. The 272 nascent
entrepreneurs that are still trying up until the final wave of data collection acquire
$241,596 on average. This is higher than both new firms ($74,177) and disengaged
($74,063). However, the data is highly skewed, and when we look at median amounts we
find that new firms acquire $14,000, nascent entrepreneurs still trying acquire $10,000,
and nascent entrepreneurs that disengage acquired $2,500.
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New Firm

Still Trying

Disengaged

Median

$14,000

$10,000

$2,500

Mean

$74,177

$241,595

$74,063

Table 1.5 : Summary Statistics for Total Financing by Outcome Status

To determine whether the relation between the amount of financing and the
nascent entrepreneur‟s outcome is statistically significant, a chi-square test of
independence is run. Table 1.6 shows the results. The relation between outcomes and the
amount of financing acquired is significant, χ2 (6, N = 1,001) = 64.63, p = .000.

| Macro-fin.
Average
Non-fin. |
Total
-------------+---------------------------------+---------New Firm |
16
153
19 |
188
|
8.5%
81.4%
10.1% |
100%
|
31.4%
20.7%
9% |
18.8%
-------------+---------------------------------+---------Still Try |
21
220
31 |
272
|
7.7%
80.88%
11.4% |
100%
|
41.2%
29.8%
14.6% |
27.1%
-------------+---------------------------------+---------Disengage |
12
299
128 |
439
|
2.7%
68.1%
29.1% |
100%
|
23.5%
40.5%
60.3% |
43.9%
-------------+---------------------------------+---------Missing |
2
66
34 |
102
|
2%
64.7%
33.3% |
100%
|
3.9%
8.9%
16% |
10.2%
-------------+---------------------------------+---------Total |
51
738
212 |
1,001
|
5.1%
73.7%
21.2% |
100%
|
100%
100%
100% |
100%
Pearson chi2(6) =
Fisher’s exact =

64.6264

Pr = 0.000
0.000

Table 1.6 : Chi-square Test of Independence Between Outcomes and Amount of
Financing.
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Macro-financers start new firms (31.4%) and disengage (23.5%) at roughly the
same rate. Among average-financers and non-financers the difference between starting a
new firm and disengaging is more pronounced – for average-financers, 20.7% start a new
firm and 40.5% disengage; for non-financers, 9% start a new firm and 60.3% disengage.
Looking across the “new firm” row, macro-financers and non-financers are getting into
business at the same rate (8.5% and 10.1%, respectively).

Financing by Source
Table 1.7 depicts the frequency and median amount of financing by source for the
entire PSED II sample. Almost all nascent entrepreneurs (92.4%) use personal savings to
finance their start-ups. The top sources of external financing are family members
(18.8%); credit cards (17%); bank loans (12%), and friends (6.4%). Nascent
entrepreneurs using no money at all make up 18.4% of the sample. Recall that the PSED
II interview schedule separated the financing items into financing acquired before, and
after, the respondent registered the business. Median amounts are shown separately in
Table 1.7, however the number of respondents in the sample that acquired financing is
small (no more than 10%), so the median values in the third column most closely
represent overall financing by source.
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N
(% of sample)

Median per
respondent

Median after
registration

Personal Savings

924
(92.4%)

$5,000

$12,000

Family/Relatives

188
(18.8%)

$4,000

$12,000

$0 (No money used)

184
(18.4%)

$0

---

Credit Card

170
(17.0%)

$4,000

$5,600

Bank Loan

120
(12.0%)

$15,000

$25,000

Friends/Colleagues

64
(6.4%)

$2,000

---

2nd mortgage/car

53
(5.3%)

$20,000

---

Other

46
(4.6%)

$195,000

$2,013

Asset Backed Debt

48
(4.8%)

$37,500

---

Bank Line of Credit

45
(4.5%)

$20,000

---

Team Loans

33
(3.3%)

$10,000

---

Leases on Equipment

31
(3.1%)

$13,500

---

Supplier Credit

27
(2.7%)

$5,000

---

Employee Loans

5
(.05%)

$4,000

---

SBA Backed Loans

3
(.03%)

$55,000

---

Venture Capital

3
(.03%)

$60,000

---

Government (non
SBA)

1
(.01%)

$2,000

---

Source

Table 1.7 : Frequency and Amount of Financing by Source.
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Analysis
Table 1.8 shows multicollinearity diagnostics for the regression model. Variance
Inflation Factors are all below 2.5, the recommended cutoff value in logistic regression
models. Tolerance values are near 1 (Allison, 1999).

Variable
VIF Tolerance
---------------------------------OUTCOME
1.11
0.8999
FINANCE
1.14
0.8804
SIZE
1.05
0.9546
LEGAL
1.04
0.9605
INDUSTRY
1.03
0.9715
METRO
1.07
0.9345
SEX
1.03
0.9754
RACE
1.06
0.9452
EDU
1.08
0.9250
LOG_EXP
1.07
0.9378
NETWORTH
1.06
0.9420
TIME
1.04
0.9629
---------------------------------Mean VIF
1.06
Table 1.8 : Multicollinearity Diagnostics

The multinomial logistic regression in Table 1.9 predicts the likelihood of the
success or disengagement of nascent entrepreneurs, using the amount of financing, firm
characteristics, and personal characteristics as predictors. The top numbers represent odds
ratios, and standard errors are in parentheses. The percent change represents a change in
odds of the upper outcome over the lower (e.g., new firm vs. disengagement) for
increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant.
Hypothesis 1, that nascent entrepreneurs using more money are less likely to
disengage, is supported. As the amount of financing increases, the odds a nascent
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entrepreneur starts a new firm over disengaging increase by 26.2%; and the odds that he
or she will be still trying after five years increases by 18.5%.
Hypothesis 2, nascent entrepreneurs expecting to grow the firm as large as
possible are less likely to disengage, is not supported. In fact, nascent entrepreneurs
expecting to start firms of a size just big enough to run either alone or with select
employees are almost twice as likely to get into business. The odds of getting into
business over disengaging increase by 89% when size expectations are low.
Hypothesis 3, nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate are less likely to disengage,
is not supported. However, nascent entrepreneurs who do not register the venture at all
(i.e., the venture is not listed as a sole-proprietorship, partnership, or corporation), are
over five times more likely to be still in process, and almost seven times more likely to
disengage, than successfully start a new firm. The odds of starting a new business over
disengaging or remaining in process drop by over 80% for these nascent entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 4, nascent entrepreneurs in asset intensive industries are less likely to
disengage, is not supported.
Hypothesis 5, nascent entrepreneurs in metro areas are less likely to disengage, is
not supported.
Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c on sex, race, and education levels, are not supported.
Hypothesis 6d, nascent entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience are less likely
to disengage, is partially supported. The more start-up experience a nascent entrepreneur
has, the odds of remaining in process over disengaging increase by 67.7%.
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Multinomial Logit Estimatesa

Percent Change in
Odds of Outcomeb

Independent
Variables

New Firm
vs
Disengage

Still Try
vs
Disengage

New Firm
vs
Still Try

Firm
vs
Dis

Try
vs
Dis

Firm
vs
Try

Finance

1.26***
(.05)

1.18***
(.04)

1.06
(.05)

26.2

18.5

6.5

Size
[small]

1.89*
(.61)

1.24
(.33)

1.53
(.50)

89.4

23.7

53.0

Legal
[incorp.]

.892
(.24)

.94
(.25)

.95
(.27)

-10.8

-5.9

-5.2

Legal
[n/a]

.146***
(.08)

.826
(.27)

.176***
(.11)

-85.4

-17.4

-82.4

Industry
[service]

1.04
(.24)

1.13
(.23)

.92
(.22)

4.1

13.3

-8.1

Metro
[Rural]

.835
(.21)

.962
(.21)

.868
(.24)

-16.5

-3.8

-13.2

Sex
[Female]

1.08
(.24)

.836
(.18)

1.29
(.32)

8.0

-16.4

29.2

Race
[minorities]

1.01
(.30)

1.12
(.27)

.954
(.27)

6.7

11.8

-4.6

Education
[College]

.824
(.23)

1.01
(.25)

.817
(.24)

-17.6

1.0

-18.4

Education
[Post-grad]

1.13
(.41)

1.24
(.41)

.917
(.35)

13.1

23.3

-8.3

Start-up
Experience

1.23
(.30)

1.68**
(.34)

.74
(.17)

23.4

67.7

-26.4

Net Worth

1*

1

1

0.0

0.0

0.0

Time

1

1.01***

.991***

0.4

1.4

-0.9

(N = 843)
chi2(df=26) = 120.33; p<0.000
Pseudo R2 = .1106
Log pseudo likelihood = -774.6
Top values are odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Percent change in odds of the upper outcome occurring over the lower,
for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables
constant.
***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05
a
b

Table 1.9:

Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Likelihood of Nascent
Outcomes Based on Amount of Financing
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Hypothesis 6e, nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth are less likely to
disengage, is not supported – but the results are interesting. As net worth increases,
nascent entrepreneurs are equally likely to either start a new business, or disengage from
the process.
While not hypothesized, the results of the control variable, TIME, reveal that as
the number of months an entrepreneur works on a startup increases, the likelihood of
starting a new firm or disengaging remains the same.

Discussion
Does money matter for successfully starting a business? The results in this
chapter‟s analysis indicate that it does. While this may seem an obvious conclusion, the
relationship between financing and a nascent entrepreneur‟s success or failure is
complex. Nascent entrepreneurs that succeed use a median amount of $14,000 compared
to a median of $2,500 by those that disengaged. However, the finance data in the PSED II
is highly skewed, with at least 10% of respondents using no money at all. The average
amount used by those that succeed and those that disengage is almost exactly the same –
slightly over $74,000. Consider too that the rates of succeeding and disengaging are the
same (1) for macro-financers using more than $230,000, and (2) as net worth increases.
This stands in contrast to formalizations of Knightian concepts of risk where increases in
wealth lead to higher likelihoods of selection into entrepreneurship (Kihlstrom & Laffont,
1979). These findings seem to reflect Knightian risk models that account for more than
just occupational choice (Newman, 2007). Specifically, the findings support the notion
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that as wealth increases, the risk of exiting entrepreneurship increases because efforts
toward the start-up need to be justified with higher returns.
A high percentage of macro-financers are “still trying” after five years in the
process of creating a venture. Recall that fewer average- and non-financers are still trying
after five years. Nascent entrepreneurs using less money are either starting businesses, or
disengaging. I had assumed that this finding reflected the macro-financers‟ pursuit of
what must be more complex opportunities that required more time and money. However,
when I compare the types of businesses started among the three groups of financers, as
well as whether patents or proprietary technology are used, I find no differences. Two
possible explanations for these results are: (1) these nascent entrepreneurs are facing
liabilities associated with large resource endowments outlined by Mosakowski (2002); or
(2) some of the opportunities pursued by the macro-financers “still trying” are poor
quality, and the large amounts of financial capital may represent a sunk cost too difficult
to walk away from.
Controlling for personal characteristics of the nascent entrepreneur; certain
aspects of the venture and industry; and for time spent on the venture - the amount of
financing does improve the odds of creating a new firm. This supports findings from
prior studies showing how bank financing correlates to growth and survivability (Cassar,
2004; Michaelas, et al., 1999). More surprising is the result from the regression model
showing that, for nascent entrepreneurs desiring to grow their venture as large as
possible, the odds of starting a new firm drop by 89%. This would indicate that risk is
connected to intentions (and possibly perceptions) of growth. Indeed, growing too fast
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can lead to rapid failure if the entrepreneur does not have the resources to support it. Risk
in this case is about whether the entrepreneur matches the right resources to the right
opportunity (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985).
Another interpretation of the finding that high growth aspirations increase the
likelihood of eventual disengagement from the start-up is that nascent entrepreneurs do
not accurately perceive their own capabilities. Prior research suggests that the
entrepreneur‟s perceived capability to acquire resources can either contribute to success,
or act as a constraint (Brown & Kirchhoff, 1997). Nascent entrepreneurs should get into
business pursuing opportunities that match their perceived capabilities. If the opportunity
is outside the range of their own capabilities then they are unlikely to create a new firm.
In light of this dissertations findings, there may be multiple factors at play: the nascent
entrepreneur‟s abilities, his motivation, and the size and complexity of the opportunity
(Chandler & Hanks, 1994). In addition, increases in entrepreneurial self-efficacy (i.e.,
perceiving oneself as capable of starting a business) should be correlated to the ability to
take advantage of these opportunities (Erikson, 2002; Krueger Jr & Dickson, 1994).
Future research into the connection between nascent entrepreneurs‟ growth perceptions
and disengagement might incorporate variables reflecting these constructs to determine
the extent to which growth perceptions by themselves affect venture outcomes.
While nascent entrepreneurs may not accurately gauge their own capabilities, it
appears that they do rapidly disengage from the process once they realize that taking
advantage of the opportunity is unlikely (or not valuable). Nascent entrepreneurs that
disengage use only $2,500 on average, compared to the $14,000 used by those starting
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new firms. The relationship between more money and increased likelihood of starting a
new firm may not be dependent on the amount of money, however. Instead it may be that
bad opportunities (or opportunities that are not matched properly to capabilities) are
found out early and get less money associated with them because they are not pursued.
Good opportunities, or well matched opportunities, are pursued and get more money.
Not unsurprisingly, nascent entrepreneurs that never legally register their nascent
venture as a sole-proprietorship, partnership, or some form of corporation, rarely start a
new firm. It is possible for a nascent entrepreneur to start a new firm without formally
registering, because the operational definition of a new firm in this dissertation is, “an
independent commercial actor, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded in the
market” (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). However, cases of non-registered new firms are rare
in the PSED II. Research on the sequence of actions during the start-up process might
explain why the majority of new firms are also registered, but I suspect that new firms are
overrepresented among registered firms in the sample. If, for example, the act of
registering the firm takes a considerable amount of time, effort, and resources (Gartner, et
al., In Press), then it is likely that firm registration will take place much later in the
sequence of actions lead to the creation of a firm. Nascent entrepreneurs that disengage
will do so before they need to register, resulting in the overrepresentation of new firms.
Perhaps the most interesting result is in Table 1.6. Macro-financers and nonfinancers start new firms at almost exactly the same rate. I stated in this chapter that more
money increases the odds of starting a new firm, but this gives the impression that giving
entrepreneurs more money will increase the rate of new firms entering the economy.
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Instead, it may be more accurate to say that no money decreases the odds of starting a
new firm. What this means for policymakers is that if the goal is to create new firms, then
perhaps this can be done with a lot less money. However, if the goal is to encourage and
support certain types of firms, then we need to investigate the macro-financing and nonfinancing groups more closely to see what types of new firms are being created. I address
this topic in Chapters 3 and 4.
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CHAPTER TWO
ACQUIRING FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO FORM NEW VENTURES:
PECKING ORDER THEORY AND THE EMERGING FIRM

Abstract
The “pecking order theory” of financing says that firms and individuals will use
personal funds before acquiring external debt and equity. This theory has been applied to
the study of established firms, but it is not clear whether entrepreneurs follow a pecking
order when financing their start-ups. This study investigates the types of financial
resources acquired over time, by individuals in the process of creating a new venture. It
uses data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II to investigate the
relationship between sources of funding and characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur.
Results indicate that entrepreneurs may follow a pecking order when financing. However,
contrary to many studies on entrepreneurial financing, individual characteristics affect
financing decisions as well.

Introduction
The focus of this dissertation is on the nascent entrepreneur, and the actions he or
she takes to create an organization (Gartner, 1988). Acquiring financial resources is one
of the principal actions that entrepreneurs undertake, yet nearly all research on business
financing has focused on established firms (Åstebro & Bernhardt, 2003; Chaganti, et al.,
1995; Ou & Haynes, 2006; Verheul & Thurik, 2001). Understanding how entrepreneurs
use and acquire financial resources during the nascent stage is critical to our
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understanding of who bears the risks of entrepreneurship (i.e., the entrepreneur, or the
financier).
Pecking Order Theory (POT) states that business owners and entrepreneurs first
use internal financing, followed by external debt and equity, in an effort to maintain
maximum control over the business, and to avoid costs resulting from information
asymmetries (Berger & Udell, 2003; Myers, 1984). Information asymmetries arise when
the entrepreneur has more information on the value of a business opportunity than the
financiers. Theoretically, financiers will account for this uncertainty and include it in the
cost of the capital provided. Entrepreneurs will attempt to avoid these costs by first
financing the venture internally.
POT was originally devised to examine the financing of large corporations, but it
has also been applied to small and medium-sized businesses. This chapter examines the
entrepreneur‟s acquisition of financing at the earliest stages of a firm‟s creation.
Specifically, it explores how progression through the venture creation process affects the
acquisition of financial resources, and whether nascent entrepreneurs actually follow a
pecking order.
Using theory from research on the sources of funding for new ventures (Cassar,
2004; Gartner, et al., In Press) and on pecking order and small firm financing (Cosh &
Hughes, 1994; Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2006; Holmes & Kent, 1991; Lopez-Gracia &
Aybar-Arias, 2000; Zoppa & McMahon, 2002), I offer a set of hypotheses about the
sources of financing that nascent entrepreneurs pursue.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: First, a theoretical background
on small firm financing and pecking order theory is provided. Second, hypotheses are
presented on whether certain characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur affect how
financial resources are acquired over time. Third, the dataset, variables, and research
design are described. Fourth, results of the data analysis are presented. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the findings.

Theory Development and Hypotheses
Until the 1990s, the majority of finance studies focused on large corporations and
publicly traded companies. Scholars then turned attention toward small firms since they
differ considerably from larger firms (Ang, 1991). Small and medium-sized businesses
face different agency and information asymmetry challenges, as they are not likely to be
publically traded or incorporated. This limits the sources of financing available to them,
and, because they are not required to share as much information as public companies,
they are information opaque (1991). Financing decisions for small ventures may also be
more complex because they are closely linked to the personal wealth or contacts of the
owner/manager. Consequently, agency problems may be more intense as shareholders
and partners are often made up of family and friends (Ang, 1992).
The pecking order theory of firm financing may explain how entrepreneurs
address these agency problems. According to this theory, individuals do not aim for a
target debt ratio. Instead, they select from funding sources that minimize the cost of
capital (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In the case of the small firm or
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entrepreneur, personal sources are used first, followed by external debt, and then outside
equity. Equity is acquired last because the entrepreneur presumably has more information
than the investor. The presence of significant information asymmetries causes the
investor to charge a higher rate of return on equity than on debt (Frank & Goyal, 2003).
Indeed, information asymmetry costs may be much higher for small firms than for large,
and the pecking order framework may explain a great deal of financing behavior by
entrepreneurs (Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2000; Scherr, et al., 1993).
To the extent that information asymmetries increase the cost of capital the smaller
(and younger) the firm, entrepreneurs should engage in a “pecking order” financing
strategy. If financiers increase the cost of capital such that it drives entrepreneurs toward
using more personalized sources of money, then it represents a significant resource
barrier for nascent entrepreneur to overcome. It also calls into question who shoulders the
risk of entrepreneurship. If entrepreneurs use their own money first, then the Knightian
view of entrepreneur as uncertainty-bearer is supported.
This chapter examines this issue using the PSED II, a sample of individuals in the
process of creating a business. Because the cases in the PSED II represent attempts at
creating a new venture, captured at the earliest stage of the process, the nature of personal
funds, debt, and equity may differ from the traditional sense. Debt and equity in a smaller
firm are more likely related to the owner‟s attitudes toward risk, or the availability of any
source of money (i.e., taking what one can get), than any formal capital structuring policy
(Levin & Travis, 1987). Modification of pecking order theory to better reflect the
circumstances of small firms may be necessary (Zoppa & McMahon, 2002).
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Reynolds (2011) categorizes financing sources from the PSED II into formal and
informal sources of financing based on whether the nascent venture is registered as a
legal entity. Certain types of financing, such as a working capital loan or bank line of
credit, are not available to entrepreneurs until the business is legally registered.
Therefore, in this analysis, I create three categories of financing: personal funds only;
external informal funds; and external formal funds. These categories represent a modified
pecking order of the acquisition of financial resources. Based on this modified pecking
order, I develop hypotheses about how nascent entrepreneurs acquire financing during the
venture creation process, taking into consideration characteristics of the firm, industry,
and individual. Clearly, the main component of pecking order theory is time. According
to the theory, entrepreneurs should use personal funds first. As time goes by they should
use more and more informal and formal sources of financing.

Hypothesis 1: Nascent entrepreneurs will more likely use personal funds early in
the venture creation process. As time goes by, they will more likely use external
informal and formal financing.

The entrepreneur‟s expectations of the future size of the business will
significantly influence whether personal and external sources of outside funds are
acquired during the start-up process. Smaller companies should require less capital. Also,
the cost to access certain kinds of funding may decline the larger the firm. Ang (1992)
finds that the high transaction costs faced by small businesses in securing outside
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financing may preclude some sources of funding. Cosh and Hughes (1994) and Cassar
(2004) find that smaller firms use relatively less outside financing.

Hypothesis 2: Nascent entrepreneurs that expected to start large businesses will
more likely acquire external informal and formal funds than nascent ventures that
are expected to be smaller in size.

Financial institutions and venture capitalists may consider the form of
incorporation to be a signal of credibility. Prior evidence by Coleman and Cohn (2000),
and Cassar (2004) suggest a positive relationship between incorporation and leverage
and/or bank financing.

Hypothesis 3: Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate will more likely acquire
external informal and formal funds than nascent ventures that are
unincorporated.

My categorization of financing into personal and external sources assumes that
the entrepreneur will be required to put in more effort (e.g. preparation of a business plan
and financial projections, and legally registering the firm) when seeking external funds. It
also assumes that providers of these funds will require this type of information to closely
monitor the start-up‟s performance. There is some debate as to the relation between
formal business planning and start-up performance. Honig and Karlsson find no positive
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outcomes associated with business planning (2004), while others find that business
planning is essential and prevents early disbanding (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Preparation
of financial statements, a form of business planning, may be critical, however, for nascent
entrepreneurs. Specifically, financial planning affords a measure of strategic legitimacy
and has been linked to organizational emergence (Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007).

Hypothesis 4: Nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections
will more likely acquire external informal and formal funds than nascent
entrepreneurs that did not create financial projections.

Start-ups in more asset-intensive industries such as mining, manufacturing, and
construction, would be expected to require larger capital outlays early-on compared to
start-ups in service industries such as consulting, financial services, and consumer
services.

Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs in asset-intensive industries will more likely
acquire external sources of financing than nascent ventures in service-oriented
industries.

Characteristics of the entrepreneur may affect access to funding. For example,
education and start-up experience may provide entrepreneurs access to funding networks
that may otherwise not be available, or signal lower risk to outside investors. Verheul and
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Thurik (2001) and Haynes and Haynes (1999) find that gender has no influence on the
likelihood of getting a loan, whereas Carter and Rose (1998) find that women tend to use
less institutional finance. Bates (1990) finds that owner educational background is a
major determinant of the capital structure of small firms. Coleman and Cohn (2000) find
that education is positively related to acquiring external loans. Findings on the effects of
the personal wealth of the nascent entrepreneur on funding choice are mixed. Avery et al.
find (1998) that the majority of small business loans are backed by personal
commitments made by the entrepreneur. Cassar (2004) found that once firm
characteristics were taken into consideration, the characteristics of the business owner do
not affect the financing of the firm.

H6a: Male nascent entrepreneurs will more likely acquire external
informal and formal financing compared to females.
H6b: Non-minority nascent entrepreneurs will more likely acquire
external informal and formal financing compared to minorities.
H6c: Nascent entrepreneurs with higher levels of education will more
likely acquire external informal and formal financing compared to nascent
entrepreneurs with low levels of education.
H6d: Nascent entrepreneurs with more start-up experience will more
likely acquire external informal and formal financing compared to nascent
entrepreneurs with little industry experience.
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H6e: Nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth will more likely
acquire external informal and formal financing compared to nascent
entrepreneurs with lower net worth.

Methodology
Sample
This analysis uses data from the PSED II to investigate nascent entrepreneur
financing. The PSED II is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of 1,214
nascent entrepreneurs in the United States. As of this writing, five waves of data have
been collected (between 2005 and 2010). All five waves are used in the analyses in this
dissertation.
Appendix A describes the screening process for identifying nascent
entrepreneurs. It also provides information on the PSED research program, rationale, and
interview schedules.
All analyses are conducted using population sample weights calculated from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights
based on the number of removed observations and final sample size N. Since I am
primarily concerned with the creation of independent, new businesses, I remove 213
observations from all analyses. These observations represent nascent entrepreneurs
engaged in other start-up opportunities. Item AA10 in the PSED II questionnaire asks,
“Would you describe this new business as an independent new business created by an
individual or a team working on its own, a purchase or takeover of an existing business, a
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franchise, a multi-level marketing initiative, a new business sponsored by an existing
business, or something else?” I remove 37 purchases or takeovers of existing businesses,
38 franchises, 55 multi-level marketing initiatives, and 83 new businesses that are
sponsored by existing businesses. The final sample in this analysis is 1,001 independent,
new businesses.
Chapter 1 described the financing variables in the PSED II questionnaire. Sections
Q and R contain items related to the sources of funding acquired by respondents. Certain
types of funding require that the business be formally established by registering with an
appropriate government agency. Section Q covers funding sources acquired before
registration. Section R covers funding sources acquired after registration.

Dependent Variable
Personal only, external-informal, and external-formal. The three categories of
financing for the dependent variable are coded as: “0” for the use of only personal
sources, “1” for external, informal sources, and “2” for external, formal sources. These
categories represent a modified pecking order of the acquisition of financial resources for
a nascent venture. Table 2.1 lists the different sources of financing from the PSED II
questionnaire, and illustrates how the different items were combined to construct the
dependent variable (Reynolds, 2011). Personal sources reflect financing that can be
acquired and used at the discretion of the entrepreneur or the start-up team. Note that
credit cards and 2nd mortgages are considered “personal” in this study. The theoretical
underpinnings to pecking order theory are risk bearing and information asymmetries.
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Source of
| Personal
External
External
Financing
|
Only
Informal
Formal
--------------------------------------------------------Personal Savings
X
Credit card loans
X
Asset backed loan
X
Personal loans
X
Loans from team
X
Family loans
Friends, employers,
Spouses, family,
Employees
Loans from others
Other pre-register

X
X
X
X
X
X

Bank loan
Asset backed debts
Leases on property
Bank line of credit,
Supplier credit
Venture Capital
Government agency
SBA guaranteed loans
Other post-register

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 2.1 : Dependent Variable Construction from Funding Sources in PSED II.

Money from credit cards is not considered external since the financier is not
monitoring how the money is used. Nor is the risk and uncertainty associated with the
business opportunity calculated into the cost of capital. A credit card will cost what it
costs, regardless of how the entrepreneur uses the money. Personal savings; credit card
loans; asset backed loans such as those coming from a 2nd mortgage; and other personal
and team loans all qualify as personal, internal funds.
The categorization of financing sources in this chapter also reflects a proposed
“alternate pecking order” where early stage ventures use sweat equity first, followed by
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credit cards and team loans; family and friends; banks; and finally equity (Zoppa &
McMahon, 2002).
External-informal sources include money acquired from family and friends; work
colleagues; employees; loans from other individuals; as well as sources classified by the
respondent as “other” (as long as the money was acquired prior to legal registration of the
business). External-formal sources include bank loans; asset backed debts and leases after
legal registration of the firm; bank lines of credit and working capital; supplier credit;
venture capital; government funding; and other sources, after legal registration of the
business.

Independent Variables
Passage of Time (WAVE). The passage of time during which financial resources
are acquired is calculated by observing the number of interview waves the respondent
participated in. Data is collected across five waves. Individuals who either started a new
firm or abandoned the process at Wave B are coded “0”; Wave C “1”; Wave D “2”;
Wave E “3”. Individuals still trying throughout all five waves are coded as “4”.
Firm Size (SIZE). Respondents are asked, “Which of the following two statements
best describes your preference for the future size of this new business: I want this new
business to be as large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a few key
employees?” SIZE is coded “0” if the individual wants it to be as large as possible; and
“1” for a size manageable by self or with key employees. Determining the size of a firm
at such an early stage presents difficulties. Traditional measures of firm size such as the
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number of employees, or the amount of revenue, do not necessarily apply to nascent
ventures as the business is not yet operational. Therefore, the growth expectation of the
nascent entrepreneur is used as a proxy, albeit an imperfect one.
Legal Status (LEGAL). Respondents are asked about the current legal form of the
new business. Dummy variables are created based on a categorical variable LEGAL,
coded “0” if the business is a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or limited
partnership; “1” if a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Sub-chapter S Corporation or
general corporation; and “2” if the legal form has not been determined by the final wave
of data collection.
Financial Planning (PLAN). Item D26 in the questionnaire asks respondents,
“Have financial projection, such as income or cash flow statements or break-even
analyses, been developed, will financial projections be developed in the future, or is this
not relevant for the new business?” PLAN is coded “0” if no formal financial took place
during the start-up process; and “1” if the nascent entrepreneur undertook some form of
formalized financial planning.
Industry (INDUSTRY). Respondents are asked to best describe the new business
based on a set of industry descriptions, which are based on NAICS codes. INDUSTRY is
coded as “0” for asset intensive industries (e.g., retail stores, restaurants, taverns, bars,
nightclubs, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, mining, wholesale distribution,
transportation, utilities, communications, and real estate); and “1” for service industries
(e.g., customer or customer service, health, education, social services, communications,
finance, insurance, and business consulting).
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Sex (SEX). SEX is coded as “0” for male; and “1” for female.
Race (RACE). RACE is coded as “0” for White/Caucasian; and “1” for
Black/African American, Asian/Asian American, and other races.
Education (EDU). EDU is a series of dummy variables based on a categorical
variable coded as “0” if the respondent completed at least a high school education; “1”
for some college, community college, or a technical or vocational degree; “2” for a
Bachelors degree; and “3” for some graduate school, a Masters degree, or for law, MD,
PhD, and EDD degrees.
Prior Start-up Experience (EXP). EXP is a series of dummy variables based on a
categorical variable coded as “0” if the respondent has no start-up experience; “1” for one
prior successful startup; “2” for two or more.
Net Worth (NETWORTH). NETWORTH is calculated from a series of questions
that determine the value of the individual‟s home(s), the amount still owed on any
mortgages, the amount of any non-home related debts, the amount of savings and
investments, and the value of any vehicles, jewelry, and other assets.
Time in Process (TIME). Data from the PSED II reveal a high level of variability
among respondents, specifically regarding the amount of time spent in the process of
creating a new venture. This “temporal heterogeneity” makes it difficult to ascertain
when, exactly, the process begins (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). Nascent entrepreneurs
do not form new ventures at the same rate, not even within the same industry. It is
possible that the longer an individual works on his or her business, the more the start-up
attempt will differ compared to others that started at the same time. For example, for each
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month a new firm ages, the hazard of establishing itself as a legal entity decreases by
19% (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Also, nascent entrepreneurs that have worked on their
business longer than 12 months may be over represented in large, representative samples
as members of their initial cohort will have either started a new firm, or disengaged in the
same period (Gartner, et al., 2004; Lichtenstein, et al., 2007). However, it also stands to
reason that nascent entrepreneurs spend more time working on businesses opportunities
that are more complex, or in complex industries. To account for this, TIME represents the
number of months between the date the individual first started thinking about the
business, and the date that the individual either (a) started a new firm, or (b) disengaged
from the process. For individuals still trying during the final wave of data collection, I
use (c) the date of the final interview.

Research Design
Similar to Headd (2003) and Cassar (2004) the categorical dependent variable,
MONEY, is tested using multinomial logistic regression. This model explains the effects
of time, as well as characteristics of the start-up and the entrepreneur, on the likelihood of
acquiring external sources of funding at later stages in the start-up process. Logistic
regression does not assume a linear relationship between the dependent and independent
variables. This is particularly important when looking at the effects of human capital on
performance, as prior studies have found linkages using nonlinear specifications
(Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). Also, homogeneity of variances within each category of
the dependent variable is not necessary.
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The analysis is conducted using population sample weights calculated from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights
based on the categorization of the dependent variable, and final sample size.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 shows the number of respondents within each category of the dependent
variable. Respondents using only some form of personal funding, without any external
funds, make up 65.6% of the sample. Informal external funds are used by 15.3%, and
formal external funds are used by 19%. Table 2.3 below depicts multicollinearity
diagnostic statistics for the regression model. Variance Inflation Factors are all below 2.5
(the recommended cutoff value in logistic regression models), and Tolerance values are
near 1 (Allison, 1999).

MONEY |
Freq.
Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------Personal |
657
65.63
65.63
Informal |
154
15.38
81.02
Formal |
190
18.98
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total |
1,001
100.00
Table 2.2 : Dependent Variable Frequency Statistics
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Variable
VIF Tolerance
---------------------------------MONEY
1.10
0.9090
WAVE
1.21
0.8240
SIZE
1.05
0.9512
LEGAL
1.03
0.9749
PLAN
1.08
0.9287
INDUSTRY
1.03
0.9726
SEX
1.02
0.9799
RACE
1.02
0.9653
EDU
1.04
0.9479
LOG_EXP
1.08
0.9295
NETWORTH
1.05
0.9484
TIME
1.19
0.8427
---------------------------------Mean VIF
1.08
Table 2.3 : Multicollinearity Diagnostics

Analysis
The multinomial logistic regression in Table 2.4 predicts the likelihood of the use
of personal or external funding, using time in process, firm characteristics, and
entrepreneur characteristics as predictors. The top numbers represent odds ratios, and
standard errors are in parentheses. The percent change represents a change in odds of the
upper outcome over the lower (e.g., new firm vs. disengagement) for increases in the
independent variable, holding all other variables constant.
Hypothesis 1, that nascent entrepreneurs will more likely use external informal
and formal sources of financing as time goes on, is partially supported. Nascent
entrepreneurs that are at least five years into the creation of a new venture are more than
twice as likely to use formal sources of finance compared to earlier in the process. The
odds of using formal financing increase 131%.
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Hypothesis 2, nascent entrepreneurs that expect to start a large business will more
likely acquire external informal and formal funding, is not supported.
Hypothesis 3, nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their start-up will more
likely acquire external informal and formal funding, is supported. Nascent entrepreneurs
of incorporated nascent ventures are 3.5 times more likely to acquire formal financing
than use personal money alone. The odds of acquiring informal financing increase 88%,
and the odds of acquiring formal financing increase 247%, compared to soleproprietorships or general partnerships. For entrepreneurs that do not register their firm at
all, the odds of using informal financing over formal increase 468%.
Hypothesis 4, nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections will
more likely acquire external informal and formal financing, is supported. The odds of
non-planners using informal financing drops 45% compared to planners, while the odds
of non-planners using formal financing drops 51%.
Hypothesis 5, nascent entrepreneurs in asset intensive industries will more likely
acquire external informal and formal financing, is supported. The odds of nascent
entrepreneurs in service-related industries using formal financing drop 35.7% compared
to those in asset intensive industries.
Hypotheses 6a and 6b are supported. The odds of females using formal financing
are 44.5% less than males. Minorities are twice as likely to use informal-external sources
over personal sources, compared to non-minorities; and they are almost 3 times more
likely to use informal-external sources over formal-external sources.
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Independent
Variables
Wave C

Multinomial Logit
Estimatesa
Informal Formal
Inform
vs
vs
vs
Personal Personal Formal
.925
.987
.937
(.30)
(.33)
(.39)

Percent Change in Odds of
Outcomeb
Informal
Formal
Inform
vs
vs
vs
Personal
Personal
Formal
-7.5

-1.3

-6.3

Wave D

.998
(.44)

1.54
(.56)

.647
(.32)

-0.2

54.2

-35.3

Wave E

1.64
(.50)

2.31***
(.67)

.710
(.26)

64.4

131.4

-29.0

Size
[small]

.684
(.20)

.801
(.22)

.852
(.28)

-31.6

-19.8

-14.7

Legal
[incorp.]

1.88*
(.56)

3.47***
(.85)

.541*
(.17)

88.1

247.3

-45.8

Legal
[n/a]

.940
(.33)

.165***
(.10)

5.69**
(3.6)

-6.0

-83.5

468.0

Fin. Plans
[No plans]

1.82**
(.13)

2.06***
(.11)

1.13
(.33)

-45.1

-51.6

13.2

Industry
[service]

1.62*
(.14)

1.55*
(.14)

.957
(.27)

-38.5

-35.7

-4.3

Sex
[Female]

.730
(.18)

1.80**
(.13)

1.31
(.38)

-27.0

-44.5

31.4

Race
[minorities]

2.14***
(.53)

.756
(.22)

2.83***
(.93)

113.9

-24.4

182.8

Education
[College]

1.05
(.28)

1.11
(.30)

.947
(.31)

5.2

11.0

-5.3

Education
[Post-grad]

.623
(.26)

1.01
(.38)

.615
(.31)

-37.7

1.4

-38.5

Start-up
Experience

1.47
(.34)

1.44
(.33)

1.02
(.28)

47.0

44.2

1.9

Net Worth

1

1*

1

0.0

0.0

0.0

Time

.997

1

.996

-0.3

0.1

-0.3

(N = 843)
chi2(df=26) = 125.67; p<0.000
Pseudo R2 = .1167
Log pseudo likelihood = -680.7
Top values are odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Percent change in odds of the upper outcome occurring over the lower,
for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables
constant.
***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05
a
b

Table 2.4:

Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Likelihood of the Use of
Personal, Informal, and Formal Financing Based on Time in Process.
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Hypotheses 6c and 6d, on education levels and prior start-up experience, were not
supported. Hypotheses 6e, nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth will more likely
acquire informal and formal funds, is not supported. However, as net worth increases, the
odds of using formal-external funds versus personal funds remain the same.

Discussion
Consistent with prior research on pecking order theory among small and mediumsized businesses, the results in this chapter indicate that nascent entrepreneurs seem to
use personal funds as the sole source of financing early in the venture creation process.
As time goes on, the likelihood of acquiring formal-external sources increases. Twothirds of all nascent entrepreneurs use only personal sources of financing. They do not
acquire any external sources of funds during the venture creation process. Those who do
use external-formal sources of financing from banks and other financial institutions are
much more likely to do so very late in the process.
Interestingly, external-formal sources of funding from banks and other financial
institutions are more commonly used than external-informal sources such as friends and
family. Here again we see the conventional wisdom of “friends, family, and fools” being
challenged – assuming that this sequence reflects the order in which each source is most
commonly used. Despite the prevalence of formal sources of financing, females and
minorities are much less likely to acquire it. This echoes findings in a number of other
studies that show minorities often face credit-constraints, such as not having access to
bank loans (Bates, 1985; Black & Strahan, 2002; Fairlie & Meyer, 1999). The result that
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minorities are much more likely to use informal sources of financing over both personal
and formal sources can be linked to a stream of research investigating “ethnic enclaves”.
An enclave consists of “…immigrant groups which concentrate in a distinct spatial
location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market…” (Portes,
1981; Sanders & Nee, 1987). The minority entrepreneurs in the PSED II are acquiring a
large portion of financing from friends and family. This finding may also be an indication
of “informal economies” within the United States. An informal economy “…comprises
economic actions that bypass the costs of, and are excluded from the protection of, laws
and administrative rules covering „property relationships, commercial licensing, financial
credit, [etc.]…‟” (Feige, 1990; Portes & Haller, 2005). Entrepreneurial effort is thought
of in terms of the community, and involvement may be shared with others in the form of
financial investments.
Personal characteristics, such as race and sex, do appear to affect a nascent
entrepreneur‟s financing behavior. Other studies on start-up financing have found that the
characteristics of the principal decision-maker are not significant (Cassar, 2004). This
may be a function of the data used in the analysis. While other studies have analyzed the
venture creation process as far back as within a few months of the legal registration of the
business, the PSED II pushes this limit even further. The PSED II investigated the
venture‟s gestation period. Again, if legal registration of the business is one of the last
acts nascent entrepreneurs perform; it would explain why prior studies only find industry
and firm factors to be of influence. Other personal characteristics affecting the acquisition
of funds in this chapter include financial planning, and net worth. Nascent entrepreneurs
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that develop formal financial plans are more likely to acquire formal financing. This is of
no surprise as formal sources such as banks will require financial projections. As the
individual‟s net worth increases, the odds of using either formal financing or only
personal money remain the same. This supports Knightian views on risk and uncertainty,
as well as pecking order theory. Wealthy nascent entrepreneurs will use their own money
to keep control of the venture and to keep capital costs low, while bearing the risk in the
process.
Nascent entrepreneurs acting in asset-intensive industries and incorporating their
start-ups are likely to use formal funds. This is consistent with prior research as well
(Cassar, 2004; Coleman & Chon, 2000).
A potential drawback to this study is that the financial variables for each source of
finding in the PSED II are not operationalized according to debt and equity – a core
premise of pecking order theory. In the PSED I, respondents are asked (for each source of
funding) whether the money was received with the expectation that it would be paid back
with interest (debt), or whether it was received with the expectation that the financier
would own part of the firm (equity). Another study finds that a clear and pronounced
pecking order does occur in the PSED I sample (Frid, 2009). Although the analysis in this
chapter took steps to reflect an “alternative pecking order” as proposed by Zoppa and
McMahon (2002) (credit cards, loans from owners, friends and family, bank, equity), the
results may actually reflect the acquisition of external informal and formal financing.
While it may seem obvious that entrepreneurs will use resources that are less
costly (and easier) to obtain, recall the Schumpeterian assumption that entrepreneurs get
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others to bear the risks of pursuing opportunities. The results in this chapter suggest that
it is the entrepreneur who bears the initial risks first, before external financiers are sought
out. An alternative explanation is that the nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II sample
are more likely to use resources that are close at hand, lending support to “bricolage”
theory (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Bricolage describes the process of starting a business
within a resource-poor environment. Nascent entrepreneurs will use resources at hand
rather than procuring them externally. The next two chapters investigate financing by
resource-rich and resource-poor nascent entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER THREE
MACRO-FINANCING: A LOOK AT HIGH POTENTIAL NEW VENTURES

Abstract
This chapter examines 51 nascent entrepreneurs that used between $230,000 and
$27.5 million during the venture creation process. These 51 cases represent the 95th
percentile of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States, as measured by the amount of
financing acquired. Nascent entrepreneurs in this category are labeled high potential,
“macro-financers” as they reside in the extreme tail of the distribution. Macro-financers
are rare individuals that drive much of the financing activity among nascent start-ups.
Industry, incorporation, and financial planning on the part of the entrepreneur affect the
likelihood that these individuals have this impact. However, characteristics of the
individual such as race, sex, education, and experience are not significant.

Introduction
New venture creation is an important driver of both job growth and innovation in
the U.S. economy (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Birch, 1979). Recently, scholars have
become increasingly interest in the importance of these “high impact” firms (Acs,
Parsons, & Tracy, 2008). These firms are few in number, yet they create a
disproportionate number of jobs and make greater contributions to GDP. While these rare
firms have attracted the attention of academic researchers and the popular press (e.g., in
popular books such as “In Search of Excellence”, “Built to Last”, and “Good to Great”),
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far less is known about successful performance and growth among nascent enterprises,
their distribution, and impact on the economy.
This chapter attempts to identify characteristics of macro-financers and their startup attempts. We would assume that nascent entrepreneurs using such vast amounts of
financing are pursuing high-value opportunities. Traditional measures of superior
performance will not work for these nascent entrepreneurs because they are still in the
gestation process. Therefore, I investigate characteristics of the individual, firm, and
environment that might affect the likelihood that he or she me a macro-financer.
I begin by examining how firm performance has been analyzed and measured by
management and entrepreneurship scholars. I then offer a series of hypotheses that
investigate characteristics of high-potential nascent ventures.

Theory Development and Hypotheses
Scholars interested in firms and individuals that significantly outperform
competitors have defined the concept of high-performance in a number of ways. The four
principal terms in the management and entrepreneurship literature are gazelles, highimpact, high-potential, and high (or superior) performance. The “gazelle” firm is likely
the most familiar. Gazelles are young, small firms that, despite their size, grow rapidly in
revenues and account for much of the job creation in the economy (Birch, 1979). Related
to the gazelle is the “high-impact” firm. Acs, et al. (2008) explicitly defines high impact
firms as enterprises that double their sales growth over a four year period and generate an
employment growth quantifier greater than two. They find that 376,605 firms met these
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requirements from 2002-2006. The average age of these firms is older than expected (25
years old), though high-impact firms might be of any age. They are also rare, comprising
only 2-3% of all firms. While “growth” is inherent to both terms, studies on gazelles and
high-impact firms tend to be concerned with issues that are broad in scope, such as
macroeconomic conditions, job creation, and economic development.
The remaining two terms, high performance and high potential, are closely
related. Carton and Hofer (2006) review how firm performance has been measured by
management scholars. Financial measures may be the most widely used measures of
performance. Subjective measures such as ROA and sales growth have been found to be
reliable as performance measures when objective measures are not available; as have
more complex measures such as the Q ratio, which is the value of individual business
units divided by the purchase cost of assets (Callard & Klein, 1985; Dess & Robinson,
1984).
Brush and VanderWerf (1992) find that among studies on entrepreneurship, 35
different measures of performance are used, the most frequent being changes in sales,
organizational survival, and changes in the number of employees. Markman & Gartner
(2002) operationalize firm growth in terms of both sales and employees and find that
among the fastest growing firms on the Inc. 500 list, young firms experience higher
profitability rates. By examining these measures across other dimensions – such as
absolute growth (annual change in numbers of employees or sales) versus relative growth
(annual percentage changes) versus organic growth (total growth minus new acquisition
growth) – researchers can better account for heterogeneity in the ways that firms grow. It
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is also known that different forms of growth are related to characteristics of the firm and
external environment (e.g., age, size, and industry) (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner,
2003).
The concept of high potential firms has most recently attracted the attention of
researchers at the Queensland University of Technology. A portion of the Comprehensive
Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) on new venture creation in
Australia identifies high potential firms using measures of human capital (the experience
and education of the entrepreneur), and whether high technology is an integral part of the
fledgling firm.
Henderson, Raynor, & Ahmed (2009) investigate “superior performers”, which
they define as firms that have consistently performed in the top 10% of ROA across the
firm‟s observed life. The objective of their study is to statistically differentiate between
firms that merit the label of superior performer, and those that are merely the result of a
random walk. They investigate superior performers using a non-distributional approach
that does not rely on systematically identifying high-performing firms. Instead, they base
their selection on actual evidence of superior performance (i.e., firms consistently in the
top 10% of ROA).
The approach I use to investigate nascent entrepreneurs in this chapter is a hybrid
of the “high-potential” characteristics used in other studies, and the “superior
performance” non-distributional approach by Henderson, et al. (2009). I select start-ups
in the 95th percentile of a nationally representative sample. Using the amount of funding
acquired by the nascent entrepreneur, I find that only 5% of the sample accounts for 95%
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of all financing in the United States from 2005 – 2010. These are the “macro-financers”,
or rare individuals that drive much of the activity among nascent start-ups.
Studies investigating the process of creating a new venture often reveal a high
level of variability among respondents, specifically regarding the amount of time spent in
the process of creating a new venture. This “temporal heterogeneity” makes it difficult to
ascertain when, exactly, the process begins (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011).

Nascent

entrepreneurs do not form new ventures at the same rate, not even within the same
industry. It is possible that the longer an individual works on his or her business, the more
the start-up attempt will differ compared to others that started at the same time. For
example, for each month a new firm ages, the hazard of establishing itself as a legal
entity decreases by 19% (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Also, nascent entrepreneurs that have
worked on their business longer than 12 months may be over represented in large,
representative samples as members of their initial cohort will have either started a new
firm, or disengaged in the same period (Gartner, et al., 2004; Lichtenstein, et al., 2007).
However, it also stands to reason that nascent entrepreneurs spend more time working on
businesses opportunities that are more complex, or in complex industries.

Hypothesis 1: The longer a nascent entrepreneur acts to create a new business,
the more likely he or she will be a macro-financer.

Many institutions consider incorporation to be a signal of credibility and
operational quality (Gartner, et al., In Press). Legal planning and the process of
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incorporating a business has been found to better protect the assets of the business and
entrepreneur, and to familiarize the entrepreneur with regulatory regimes relevant to the
start-up (Malach, et al., 2006). If true for nascent entrepreneurs, one would expect a
higher likelihood of the formation of a new firm.

Hypothesis 2: Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their nascent ventures are
more likely to be macro-financers.

There is some debate as to the relation between formal business planning and
start-up performance. Honig and Karlsson find no positive outcomes associated with
business planning (2004), while others find that business planning is essential and
prevents early disbanding (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Preparation of financial statements, a
form of business planning, may be critical, however, for nascent entrepreneurs.
Specifically, financial planning affords a measure of strategic legitimacy and has been
linked to organizational emergence (Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007).

Hypothesis 3: Nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections
will more likely become macro-financers.

A recent study of young Swedish firms has found that industry level matters little
for performance measures such as survival, sales, and sales growth (Short, et al., 2009). I
surmise, however, that nascent entrepreneurs face more complexity when attempting to
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start businesses in industries that are more asset intensive, such as mining,
manufacturing, and construction. Larger capital outlays are required early in the venture
creation process, compared to service industries such as consulting, financial services,
and consumer services (Gartner, et al., In Press).

Hypothesis 4: Nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses in asset intensive
industries will more likely become macro-financers.

Nascent entrepreneurs may benefit depending on their location. Concentrations of
people and businesses enable sharing of culture and resources, as well as providing
access to specialized knowledge (Plummer & Pe‟er, 2010). Firms located in strong
clusters have been linked to higher rates of survival and performance (Wennberg &
Lindqvist, 2010). Within metro areas, immigrant entrepreneurial efforts are more likely to
survive as they can draw on immediately available social capital (Kalnins & Chung,
2006). Metro areas also afford access to diverse resources often lacking in rural areas,
and it has been shown that metro startups tend to fare better, controlling for firm strategy
and industry (Stearns, et al., 1995).

Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs in or near metro areas will more likely
become macro-financers.
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The use of patents or proprietary technology has been used as an indicator of a
firm‟s high potential; perhaps most notably by the CAUSEE research initiative that
includes an oversampling of high potential nascent ventures in Australia. I surmise that
nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses involving the use of proprietary technology are
likely to raise more money and need more employees at an early stage (if successful).

Hypothesis 6: Nascent entrepreneurs creating businesses centered on proprietary
technology will more likely become macro-financers.

Nascent ventures are unlikely to have gone through a process of
institutionalization, so it is likely that personal characteristics play a strong role in
signaling information to outsiders (Kimberly, 1979). New ventures started by females
still underperform ventures started by males in measures of size, profitability, and
number of employees hired (Robb & Coleman, 2009). Firms started by females also have
lower survival rates, compared to firms started by males (Fairlie & Robb, 2009).
Fairlie and Robb find that minority owned businesses tend to be smaller and less
successful – specifically they suffer lower sales and fewer employees, according to data
from the 2006 U.S. Census (2008). Edelman et al. (2010) find that motives differ among
minority businesses to grow, but not necessarily to start.
Education, industry experience, and involvement in prior start-ups may provide
entrepreneurs access to funding networks that may otherwise not be available, or signal
lower risk to outside investors (Gartner, et al., In Press). Van Der Sluis et al. find that
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education is not important for selection into entrepreneurship, but it is positively related
to firm performance on the individual decides to act as an entrepreneur (2008). Robinson
and Sexton (1994) find that higher education also relates to higher performance. From a
legitimacy perspective, while industry experience may not be important, start-up
experience is related to higher performance (Delmar & Shane, 2004).
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that individuals do not use more than 1.5 times
their initial assets to start a new venture. In Thailand, financing seems to be a constraint wealthier households are more likely to start a business and invest more in their
businesses compared to other households (Paulson & Townsend, 2004). Parker (2004)
posits that high net worth individuals are be more likely to enter into entrepreneurship for
reasons that are not yet measureable (e.g. they may be “inherently acquisitive”).

Hypothesis 7a: Male entrepreneurs are more likely to be macro-financers
than female nascent entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 7b: Non-minority nascent entrepreneurs are more likely to be
macro-financers than minority nascent entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 7c: Nascent entrepreneurs with higher education levels are
more likely to be macro-financers than those that are less educated.
Hypothesis 7d: Nascent entrepreneurs that have started successful
businesses in the past are more likely to be macro-financers than those who have
no prior start-up experience.
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Hypothesis 7e: Nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth are more
likely to be macro-financers than those with a lower net worth.

Methodology
Sample
This analysis uses data from the PSED II to investigate nascent entrepreneur
financing. The PSED II is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of 1,214
nascent entrepreneurs in the United States. As of this writing, five waves of data have
been collected (between 2005 and 2010). All five waves are used in the analyses in this
dissertation.
Appendix A describes the screening process for identifying nascent
entrepreneurs. It also provides information on the PSED research program, rationale, and
interview schedules.
All analyses are conducted using population sample weights calculated from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights
based on the number of removed observations and final sample size N. Since I am
primarily concerned with the creation of independent, new businesses, I remove 213
observations from all analyses. These observations represent nascent entrepreneurs
engaged in other start-up opportunities. Item AA10 in the PSED II questionnaire asks,
“Would you describe this new business as an independent new business created by an
individual or a team working on its own, a purchase or takeover of an existing business, a
franchise, a multi-level marketing initiative, a new business sponsored by an existing
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business, or something else?” I remove 37 purchases or takeovers of existing businesses,
38 franchises, 55 multi-level marketing initiatives, and 83 new businesses that are
sponsored by existing businesses. The final sample in this analysis is 1,001 independent,
new businesses.
Chapter 1 described the financing variables in the PSED II questionnaire. Sections
Q and R contain items related to the sources of funding acquired by respondents. Certain
types of funding require that the business be formally established by registering with an
appropriate government agency. Section Q covers funding sources acquired before
registration. Section R covers funding sources acquired after registration.

Dependent Variable
FINANCE. The dependent variable is categorized as the three financing groups
described in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Macro-financers are coded “0”, and represent
the nascent ventures in the PSED II data set that acquired over $230,000 during the startup process. These firms fall in the 95th percentile of the distribution of firm financing.
Average financers are coded as “1” and represent those acquiring amounts near the
average amount of financing for all firms, which is $24,077. Non-financers are coded as
“2”. This category includes nascent entrepreneurs using $0 - $500.

Independent and Control Variables
Time in Process (TIME). TIME represents the number of months between the date
the individual first started thinking about the business, and the date that the individual
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either (a) started a new firm, or (b) disengaged from the process. For individuals still
trying during the final wave of data collection, I use (c) the date of the final interview.
The time in process, industry, and education variables address issues of sample
heterogeneity related to samples of nascent ventures (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011).
Legal Status (LEGAL). Respondents are asked about the current legal form of the
new business. Dummy variables are created based on a categorical variable LEGAL,
coded “0” if the business is a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or limited
partnership; “1” if a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Sub-chapter S Corporation or
general corporation; and “2” if the legal form has not been determined by the final wave
of data collection.
Financial Planning (PLAN). Item D26 in the questionnaire asks respondents,
“Have financial projection, such as income or cash flow statements or break-even
analyses, been developed, will financial projections be developed in the future, or is this
not relevant for the new business?” PLAN is coded “0” if no formal financial took place
during the start-up process; and “1” if the nascent entrepreneur undertook some form of
formalized financial planning.
Industry (INDUSTRY). Respondents are asked to best describe the new business
based on a set of industry descriptions, which are based on NAICS codes. INDUSTRY is
coded as “0” for asset intensive industries (e.g., retail stores, restaurants, taverns, bars,
nightclubs, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, mining, wholesale distribution,
transportation, utilities, communications, and real estate); and “1” for service industries
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(e.g., customer or customer service, health, education, social services, communications,
finance, insurance, and business consulting).
Metro Location (METRO). Based on the respondent‟s zip code and categorization
by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, METRO is coded as “0” if
the respondent lives in the center city of a metro area, inside a center city county, inside a
suburban county, or in a general metropolitan area; and “1” if living in a rural area.
Proprietary technology (TECH). Respondents are asked, “Has this new business
developed any proprietary technology, processes, or procedures that no other company
can use, will it develop proprietary technology, processes, or procedures in the future, or
is this not relevant to the new business?” TECH is coded as “0” for Yes, and “1” for No.
Sex (SEX). SEX is coded as “0” for male; and “1” for female.
Race (RACE). RACE is coded as “0” for White/Caucasian; and “1” for
Black/African American, Asian/Asian American, and other races.
Education (EDU). EDU is a series of dummy variables based on a categorical
variable coded as “0” if the respondent completed at least a high school education; “1”
for some college, community college, or a technical or vocational degree; “2” for a
Bachelors degree; and “3” for some graduate school, a Masters degree, or for law, MD,
PhD, and EDD degrees.
Prior Start-up Experience (EXP). EXP is a series of dummy variables based on a
categorical variable coded as “0” if the respondent has no start-up experience; “1” for one
prior successful startup; “2” for two or more.
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Net Worth (NETWORTH). NETWORTH is calculated from a series of questions
that determine the value of the individual‟s home(s), the amount still owed on any
mortgages, the amount of any non-home related debts, the amount of savings and
investments, and the value of any vehicles, jewelry, and other assets.
Firm Size (SIZE). I control for firm size as it is frequently linked to the survival
and performance of new firms. Larger firms are more likely to survive, and larger new
ventures are more likely to benefit from scale economies (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994;
Geroski, et al., 2010). Smaller companies have also been found to have higher death
rates, compared to larger firms (Dunne & Hughes, 1994; Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009)
Small businesses may also have a difficult time with high transaction costs associated
with the acquisition of resources such as formal funding or expensive equipment (Ang,
1992).
Respondents are asked, “Which of the following two statements best describes
your preference for the future size of this new business: I want this new business to be as
large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a few key employees?”
SIZE is coded “0” if the individual wants it to be as large as possible; and “1” for a size
manageable by self or with key employees. Determining the size of a firm at such an
early stage presents difficulties. Traditional measures of firm size such as the number of
employees, or the amount of revenue, do not necessarily apply to nascent ventures as the
business is not yet operational. Therefore, the size intentions of the nascent entrepreneur
is used as a proxy, albeit and imperfect one.
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Research Design
The categorical dependent variable representing the three categories nascent
venture financing amounts (non-financing, average, and fat-tail financing) is tested using
multinomial logistic regression. The model estimates effects certain firm characteristics
have on the likelihood that a nascent venture will fall within the fat-tail of a series of
success measures. All analyses are weighted so that the sample better matches the overall
population. The number of nascent ventures tested is 939 (missing values among the
independent and control variables result in a loss of 62 cases).

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows the frequency counts for each category of financing represented
in the dependent variable. Average financers make up the largest group, with 738 cases;
212 cases are non-financers; and 51 cases are fat-tail financers using more than $230,000
to fund the nascent venture. Table 3.2 depicts the multicollinearity diagnostics for the
model. Variance Inflation Factors are all below 2.5, and Tolerance values are near 1
(Allison, 1999).
FIN_GRP |
Freq.
Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------Fat Tail |
51
5.09
5.09
Average |
738
73.73
78.82
Non |
212
21.18
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total |
1,001
100.00
Table 3.1 : Dependent Variable Distribution
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Variable
VIF Tolerance
---------------------------------FAT TAIL
1.13
0.8870
TIME
1.04
0.9598
LEGAL
1.03
0.9663
PLAN
1.10
0.9113
INDUSTRY
1.02
0.9778
METRO
1.08
0.9219
TECH
1.07
0.9324
SEX
1.02
0.9804
RACE
1.09
0.9187
EDU
1.09
0.9194
LOG_EXP
1.08
0.9264
NETWORTH
1.07
0.9373
SIZE
1.06
0.9472
---------------------------------Mean VIF
1.07
Table 3.2 : Multicollinearity Diagnostics

Analysis
The multinomial logistic regression in Table 3.3 predicts the likelihood of the
nascent entrepreneur being a macro-financer, average-financer, or non-financer, using
time, firm characteristics, and personal characteristics as predictors. The top numbers
represent odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses below. The percent change
represents a change in odds of the upper outcome over the lower (e.g., macro-financer
versus non-financer) for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables
constant.
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Independent
Variables
Time

Multinomial Logit
Estimatesa
Macro
Macro
Average
vs
Vs
vs
Non
Average
Non
1.00*
1.00
1.00*
(.004)
(.002)
(.003)

Percent Change in Odds of
Outcomeb
Macro
Macro Average
vs
vs
vs
Non
Average
Non
0.7

0.1

0.6

Legal
[incorp.]

5.39***
(2.47)

5.62***
(2.12)

.973
(.29)

466.6

482.2

-2.7

Legal
[n/a]

.774
(.72)

1.33
(1.2)

.579*
(.14)

-22.3

34.2

-42.1

Fin. Plans
[No plans]

12.0***
(.05)

5.18***
(.10)

.436***
(.10)

-91.7

-81.0

-56.4

Industry
[service]

3.75**
(.13)

3.46**
(.13)

.932
(.19)

-72.7

-70.7

-6.8

Metro
[Rural]

1.09
(.15)

.969
(.12)

1.70*
(.39)

110.9

24.1

69.9

Tech
[None]

1.60
(.88)

1.27
(.55)

1.29
(.48)

65.2

28.1

29.0

Sex
[Female]

.443
(.21)

.589
(.26)

.758
(.15)

-56.3

-42.3

-24.2

Race
[minorities]

.795
(.43)

.740
(.37)

1.05
(.25)

-19.2

-23.3

5.4

Education
[College]

.978
(.45)

.689
(.29)

1.43
(.31)

1.5

-29.4

43.7

Education
[Post-grad]

1.78
(1.16)

1.94
(1.14)

.925
(.30)

80.6

95.2

-2.4

Start-up
Experience

1.43
(.73)

1.26
(.56)

1.13
(.29)

42.2

26.3

12.6

Net Worth

1

1*

1

0.0

0.0

0.0

Size
[small]

.348*
(.17)

.446*
(.18)

.759
(.23)

-67.3

-56.9

-24.1

(N = 939)
chi2(df=28) = 113.28; p<0.000
Pseudo R2 = .1338
Log pseudo likelihood = -553.12
Top values are odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Percent change in odds of the upper outcome occurring over the lower,
for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables
constant.
***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05
a
b

Table 3.3:

Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Likelihood of MacroFinancing, Based on Firm and Personal Characteristics.
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Hypothesis 1, the more time nascent entrepreneurs act to create a new firm, the
more likely they are to be macro-financers, is not supported. In fact, as time goes on,
nascent entrepreneurs are equally likely to be either macro-financers or non-financers.
Hypothesis 2, nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their nascent ventures are
more likely to be macro-financers, is supported. Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate
are over five times more likely to be macro-financers than non-financers; and over five
times more likely to be macro-financers than average-financers.
Hypothesis 3, nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections will
more likely be macro-financers, is supported. The odds of macro-financing over nonfinancing drop by 91.7% for nascent entrepreneurs that do not create financial plans,
while the odds of macro-financing over average-financing drop by 81%. The odds of
average-financing over non-financing drop by 56.4% for non-planners.
Hypothesis 4, nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses in asset intensive
industries will more likely be macro-financers, is supported. The odds of macro-financing
over non-financing for nascent entrepreneurs in service industries drop by 72.7%, and the
odds of macro-financing over average-financing drop by 70.7%.
Hypothesis 5, nascent entrepreneurs in or near metro areas will more likely be
macro-financers, is not supported. However, the odds of average-financing over nonfinancing for rural nascent entrepreneurs increase by 69.9%.
Hypothesis 6, nascent entrepreneurs creating businesses using on proprietary
technology will more likely be macro-financers, is not supported.
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Hypotheses 7a – 7e dealing with characteristics of the entrepreneur (i.e., sex, race,
education, experience, and net worth) were not supported. Personal characteristics did not
affect whether a nascent entrepreneur use or acquire vast amounts of financing.
This analysis also controlled for the nascent entrepreneur‟s growth intentions for
the venture. For those nascent entrepreneurs expecting to keep the venture to a
manageable size (i.e., able to be run individually or with a few key employees), the odds
of macro-financing over non-financing drop by 67.3%. Also, the odds of macro-financing
over average-financing drop by 56.9% for this same group.

Discussion
The previous analyses in this dissertation find that personal characteristics such as
sex, race, education, and experience do affect the start-up outcomes, as well as the types
of financing used and acquired. The personal characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs are
not a significant indicator for whether vast amounts of financing are used, however. This
finding echoes similar findings in other studies on start-up financing (Cassar, 2004), and
may be an indication that as nascent ventures transition into new firms (i.e., independent
actors affecting prices and quantities in the larger economy), firm and industry
characteristics explain more of the variance between financing groups. The reality is that
there does not seem to be an archetypical “macro-financer”, or high-potential nascent
entrepreneur. Macro-financers come from different socioeconomic backgrounds; start
different types of firms; and in different industries.
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While there may not be any one “type” of macro-financer, certain firm and
industry characteristics are associated with a high likelihood of using or acquiring large
amounts of money. This analysis controls for the growth intentions of the nascent
entrepreneur, and finds that those intending to grow their ventures as large as possible are
more likely to be macro-financers. Other studies find growth intentions of early stage
entrepreneurs to be associated with seeking out larger amounts of external equity
(Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2006). In light of findings in Chapter 1, it would seem that
while nascent entrepreneurs accurately match growth intentions to resource acquisition
strategies, they may not be as successful matching overall growth strategies to the
opportunity being pursued. The analysis in Chapter 1 finds that nascent entrepreneurs
intending to grow the firm as large as possible are less likely to create a new firm. Taken
together the two findings support assertions that entrepreneurial risk is linked to how well
the entrepreneur matches resources to the opportunity (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985).
The longer a nascent entrepreneur works on the venture, the likelihood of using
either a lot of money or no money at all increases equally. Macro-financers also are more
likely to continue working on the venture for at least five years, compared to averagefinancers. It appears that the amount of time spent working on the nascent venture has an
accelerated effect on whether a nascent entrepreneur‟s efforts result in being categorized
into certain “outlier” groups – in this case, macro-financers and non-financers. The
relationship between time and performance has been investigated, drawing similar
conclusions. Corporate entrepreneurship has a modest effect on company performance
early on, but increases with time (Zahra & Covin, 1995); and the same as been found in
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the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation (i.e., acting proactively, innovatively,
and taking risks) and performance (Wiklund, 2006).
Macro-financers are more likely to have incorporated their nascent ventures, and
to have prepared formalized financial plans. They are also more likely to be starting
ventures in asset-intensive industries. These results are consistent with almost all studies
on entrepreneurial financing where both the type of financing (i.e., formal sources such as
banks) and amount correlate to firm and industry characteristics. We would expect
incorporated nascent ventures in industries such as manufacturing, retail, and
construction to require large capital outlays.
The results for rural nascent entrepreneurs compared to nascent entrepreneurs
located in metro areas are not statistically significant. However, rural nascent
entrepreneurs are more likely to be average financers than non-financers. Investigating
the non-financers in more detail reveals that many are consultants and have considerable
experience in a specific industry. It is likely that these non-financers need to be near their
clients, and surrounded by the market in which they operate. Therefore, non-financing,
rural nascent entrepreneurs will be an unlikely combination. The non-financers are
investigated in more detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NASCENT ENTREPRENEURS THAT USE LITTLE TO NO FINANCING

Introduction
Chapter 1 introduced two views on who bears the risks of entrepreneurship. The
Schumpeterian view is that the entrepreneur‟s role is to innovate and introduce new
combinations of resources and means of production to the economy. The Schumpeterian
entrepreneur does not bear the risk, the financier does. The Knightian view of
entrepreneurship differentiates between risk and uncertainty – risk is calculable and able
to be insured against while uncertainty is made up of the “unknown unknowns”. Knight‟s
entrepreneur bears this uncertainty and shields financiers from it.
The findings from the analyses in Chapters 1 and 2 support the Knightian view. In
the context of the financing of emerging firms, nascent entrepreneurs first bear the risk
before external financiers enter the picture. However, most empirical investigations into
Knightian entrepreneurship assume that risk is endogenous to the entrepreneur, taking the
form of occupational choice between salaried work, or creating a new firm (Newman,
2007). During the interview process for the PSED II, respondents who disengage from
the start-up process are asked why they did so. Only 9% of nascent entrepreneurs in the
U.S. who disengage between 2005 and 2010 do so for other career opportunities. The
number one reason for disengaging is personal issues – 38% of respondents cite lifechanging events (e.g., divorce, having a baby), or health issues (e.g., lung cancer).
The notion of risk is much more nuanced for nascent entrepreneurs than depicted
by traditional theory. Or, it is at least more nuanced than has been traditionally
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investigated by scholars throughout the years. Another view on the risks involved with
entrepreneurship, mentioned in previous chapters, is proposed by Stevenson and
Gumpbert (1985): risk for the entrepreneur is based on whether the individual properly
matches resources at-hand to the opportunity pursued. Much of the research on
entrepreneurship is rooted in the resource based theory of the firm. According to this
view, firms achieve a competitive advantage over other firms when they acquire
resources that are rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and costly to imitate (Barney, 1991).
Financial resources have been linked to growth and performance in both large and small
firms, and few would dispute the importance of cash to an early-stage venture. Yet, from
the PSED II sample used in this dissertation we can see that 20% of nascent ventures in
the U.S. rely on $500 or less during the process of creating the firm. Of this group of nonfinancers, 17 become operational, new firms by 2010.
This chapter describes these ventures that begin with very little financial capital,
and the individuals that start them. One might assume that nascent ventures using little to
no money are routine start-ups – businesses that can be run from the home and based on
skills and tools already acquired by the individual (e.g., a barber or hairstylist, a daycare,
consulting). But, consider the example of Sierra On-Line. Sierra created the first
graphics-based computer games in the early 1980s, and was eventually sold to a
conglomerate for close to $1 billion. The company was started by Ken and Roberta
Williams. Ken, a programmer for IBM, and his wife Roberta, created the first game
entitled Mystery House. The game was created in their home with Roberta doing much of
the writing and art work at the kitchen table. Mystery House was written onto floppy
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discs, packaged in Ziploc bags, and mailed to friends and co-workers. Sierra On-Line
eventually went on to create many of the best-selling games of that decade. One might
attribute Sierra‟s success to being in a high-growth industry (i.e., the personal computing
industry was poised to explode in the early 1980s). While this was definitely a factor,
consider the mundane, low-margin grocery industry. Even Whole Foods was once young,
founded by a college dropout and his girlfriend who, while living in the back room of
their first store, took showers with a hose attached to a dishwasher.
The PSED II allows for the investigation of new firms created under conditions of
resource scarcity. Analyzing these ventures from a resource perspective may reveal
information that a traditional Knightian risk analysis cannot. In the remainder of this
chapter I provide an overview of the theoretical frameworks of bootstrapping,
effectuation, and bricolage, each of which addresses the issue of starting a firm with
limited resources. I will also present data from the PSED II on the non-financed nascent
ventures.

Literature Related to Non-Financing
Over the past decade, the resource based theory of firm performance has featured
prominently in the entrepreneurship literature. The resource based view is a concept from
the field of strategic management that says that a firm‟s success or failure depends on the
resources it controls (Barney, 1991). It is reasonable to assume that nascent ventures
control fewer resources than established firms – financing in particular. Indeed, new
firms in the PSED II sample are largely defined by whether they have had positive cash
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flow for most of the year. But, if nascent entrepreneurs have access to fewer resources,
how then are they able to catch up, and even compete with, established businesses?
It may be that large resource endowments actually hinder some entrepreneurs.
Costs associated with easy access to resources include core rigidities (becoming so good
at something that past success makes it difficult to pursue new trajectories); reduced
experimentation (past successes making new opportunities seem less valuable or more
risky); and increased transparency (as more resources are controlled, competitors become
more aware of what strategy the firm is trying to pursue) (Mosakowski, 2002).
Avoidance of these costs may partially explain how start-ups that use little to no
financing are able to get off the ground.
While a resource-based view of the firm may be useful for analyzing some
aspects of the entrepreneurial process, it may be an inadequate framework for studying
nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED. An analysis of the resources possessed by the
founders of Sierra On-Line during its first year in the early 1980s might generate the
following list:



Intangible resources: Ken Williams‟ knowledge of computer programming; his
contacts in the fledgling industry; Roberta Williams‟ passion for writing stories



Tangible resources: personal computer; space at home to work; the founders‟
income; net worth, and any assets (leverage for a bank loan, if needed); blank
floppy discs, stamps, envelopes, and Ziploc bags for packaging and shipping
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Not exactly the harbinger of a multi-million dollar software company that would
go on to revolutionize video game design. A nascent entrepreneur‟s stock of resources
may be so vague or nondescript that a purely resource-based analysis will fail to reveal
the potential value. For this reason, analyzing the nascent entrepreneur‟s actions and
intentions are important if one wishes to draw conclusions from the earliest stages of
organizational creation.
Chapter 1 presented a bootstrapping framework for analyzing entrepreneurial
activity. Financial bootstrapping strategies are methods of meeting financial resource
needs without resorting to sources of external financing. Methods of bootstrapping might
include delaying payments to suppliers to preserve cash-on-hand, drawing on support
from friends and family for financing or office space, reducing accounts receivable and
inventory, or developing strong support networks (Winborg & Landström, 2001). Prior
research on bootstrapping has found that technology-based firms place more importance
on bootstrapping techniques that improve cash flows, compared to nontechnology-based
firms (e.g. terminating agreements with late payers, using credit cards, charging interest
on overdue accounts, and borrowing equipment) (Auken, 2005). Also, bootstrapping
strategies may differ depending on the age of the firm. Early stage firms rely more on
owner-related and relationship-oriented techniques, while more developed firms depend
on customer-related techniques such as the negotiation of payment terms (Ebben &
Johnson, 2006).
The thought processes that underlie a nascent entrepreneur‟s actions can also
reveal how non-financers or otherwise resource-poor individuals are able to start
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successful businesses. Effectual reasoning is a process by which the entrepreneur uses a
set of evolving means already possessed to creatively achieve or transform a goal
(Sarasvathy, 2001). Effectuation stands in contrast to the standard belief that
entrepreneurs set a goal before identifying what resources and steps are necessary to
achieve it. Returning to the example of Sierra On-Line, Ken and Roberta Williams took
stock in what they had (knowledge, industry connections, passion and interest in the
endeavor), and then experimented and transformed these resources into a viable product
(a graphics-based computer mystery game).
Effectuation is closely related to financial bootstrapping in that the entrepreneur
leverages his or her social network to cut costs. The concept of affordable loss may also
be linked to the PSED‟s group of non-financers. Affordable loss entails risking only what
is necessary so that if the entrepreneur fails, he does so cheaply. As a decision tool for
financing the emerging firm, affordable loss means creatively lowering the amount of
money needed to start the business by accounting for how much time is necessary to
work on the business, the opportunity cost of any money invested, and deciding exactly
how much one is willing to lose (Sarasvathy, 2006).
Whereas effectuation theory describes the cognitive processes underpinning
entrepreneurial decision making, bricolage theory directly addresses how entrepreneurs
act in the face of severe resource constraints. Bricolage is a term originally coined by
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and is about making do with current resources, rather
than engaging in resource-seeking behavior. A key proposition of bricolage theory as it
relates to entrepreneurial activity is that founders‟ activities will be strongly shaped by
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the contact networks in which they operate (Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003). Sierra OnLine‟s founders, again, can be viewed as an example of using resources at hand.
Following Baker and Nelson‟s (2005) process model of bricolage and growth, Sierra‟s
founders generated “something from nothing” (i.e., using Ken‟s experience and network
contacts, and Roberta‟s story writing inputs to create a graphics-based adventure game),
and through mutually reinforcing factors, such as the initial acceptance of the first
samples of the game sent out to friends and family in Ziploc bags, as well as being in the
right place at the right time (i.e., California in the early 1980s in the midst of a growing
personal computing industry), the nascent venture was able to grow into a successful new
firm.
What emerges from looking at Sierra‟s early years from a bricolage framework is
the relative non-importance of financial capital. Remember, Sierra was a nascent venture
that would go on to a successful IPO before being sold for almost $1 billion dollars, more
than 20 years after humble beginnings in the home of a spousal team. This is not to say
that money was not important. What bricolage does reveal in this case is that competent
founders will find a way. Research has demonstrated that human and financial capital
may be substitutable – firms with high levels of founder human capital and low levels of
financial capital perform as well as firms with low human capital, and high financial
capital (Chandler & Hanks, 1998).
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Analysis of Non-Financers in the PSED II
To identify the non-financers in the PSED II, I calculate the sum total of all
financial capital acquired or drawn from the respondent‟s personal savings. Of the 1,001
respondents who indicate that they are starting an independent new venture, 212 (19%)
said that they acquired $500 or less between 2005 and 2010. Table 4.1 shows the number
of these “non-financers” to start a new firm, disengage, or remain trying throughout all
five years of the sample. Perhaps not surprisingly, 128 (60.4%) non-financing, nascent
entrepreneurs disengage from the process of starting a new business. Of the remaining
non-financers: 31 (14.6%) are still trying; and 17 (9%) successfully start new firms. Note
that 34 (16%) cases are missing. No information is available for these cases as they were
unreachable by the survey administrators after initial screening took place in 2005.

| New Firm
Still Try
Disengage
Missing
Total
---------------------------------------------------------|
17
31
128
34
212
| 8.96%
14.62%
60.38%
16.04%
100%
---------------------------------------------------------Table 4.1 : Nascent Venture Outcomes for Non-Financed Startup Attempts

Analyses in previous chapters have shown that more money is associated with a
higher likelihood of success in starting a new firm, when controlling for factors such as
industry, and characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur. However, there is no statistical
difference between non-financers that successfully start a new business and non-financers
that disengage from the process, when looking at each factor separately. Tables 4.2
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through 4.10 show the frequencies of the final outcome of non-financed nascent ventures
by the variables uses throughout the analyses in this dissertation.
Industry. Non-financed, successful new ventures are split relatively evenly
between asset intensive industries (42.1%), and service industries (58%). Non-financed
nascent ventures that disengaged from the start-up process are also evenly split – 46.8%
in asset intensive industries, and 53.1% in service industries.
Legal Form. Among successful new firms, 33.3% are incorporated. Among
disengaged nascent ventures, 18.9% are incorporated.
Financial Planning. Among new firms, 36.9% undertake formal financial
planning; among disengaged firms, 25% do.
Metro Location. Among new firms, 89.4% are in or near metro areas; among
disengaged firms, 75.8% are.
Proprietary Technology. Among new firms, 10.5% utilize proprietary technology;
among disengaged firms only 5.5% do.
Sex. Whether a start-up attempt results in a new firm or is disengaged is evenly
split between males and females. Among new firms, 52.6% are started by males and
47.4% by females.
Race. Minorities account for 15.7% of all non-financed new firms, and 25.7% of
disengaged firms.
Education. Nascent entrepreneurs with a post-graduate education (masters degree
or higher), account for 31.6% of all non-financed new firms and 15% of disengaged
firms.
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Start-up Experience. Among non-financed new firms, 36.9% are started by
nascent entrepreneurs with two or more prior successful start-ups. For nascent
entrepreneurs with no prior start-up experience, 61% disengage from the process.
None of the cell differences in these tables are statistically significant.

INDUSTRY | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------Asset |
8
12
60
|
42.11
38.71
46.88
-----------+--------------------------------Non Asset |
9
19
68
|
57.89
61.29
53.13
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
128
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.2 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Industry
LEGAL | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------Uninc |
12
22
73
|
66.67
84.62
81.11
-----------+--------------------------------Inc |
5
4
17
|
33.33
15.38
18.89
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
26
90
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.3 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Legal Form
FIN. PLAN | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------Yes |
6
9
32
|
36.84
29.03
25.00
-----------+--------------------------------No |
11
22
96
|
63.16
70.97
75.00
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
128
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.4 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Financial Planning

102

METRO | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------Metro |
15
25
97
|
89.47
80.65
75.78
-----------+--------------------------------Rural |
2
6
31
|
10.53
19.35
24.22
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
128
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.5 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Metro Location
TECH | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------No |
16
26
120
|
89.47
83.87
94.49
-----------+--------------------------------Yes |
1
5
7
|
10.53
16.13
5.51
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
127
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.6 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Proprietary Technology
SEX | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------Male |
9
17
71
|
52.63
54.84
55.47
-----------+--------------------------------Female |
8
14
57
|
47.37
45.16
44.53
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
128
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.7 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Sex
RACE | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-------------+--------------------------------Non Minority |
16
24
95
|
84.21
77.42
74.22
-------------+--------------------------------Minority |
1
7
33
|
15.79
22.58
25.78
-------------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
128
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.8 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Race
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EDU | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------HS |
2
13
46
|
15.79
41.94
36.22
-----------+--------------------------------College |
9
15
62
|
52.63
48.39
48.82
-----------+--------------------------------Post Grad |
6
3
19
|
31.58
9.68
14.96
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
127
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.9 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Education
STARTUPS | New Firm Still Try Disengage
-----------+--------------------------------None |
6
15
78
|
36.84
48.39
60.94
-----------+--------------------------------1 |
4
9
26
|
26.32
29.03
20.31
-----------+--------------------------------2+ |
7
7
24
|
36.84
22.58
18.75
-----------+--------------------------------Total |
17
31
128
|
100.00
100.00
100.00

Table 4.10 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Start-Up Experience

A closer look at the non-financers from the PSED II who successfully start a new
firm reveals more detailed information. Three respondents have a net worth greater than
$1 million, while four have a negative net worth. One is Hispanic, and the remaining
Caucasian. Nine successful non-financers (close to 50%) run the business from their
primary residence, while in the overall sample approximately 25% of all new firms are
home-based. Only two respondents produced a formally written business plan during the
start-up process.
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Respondent 50095. Female, age 40-44, unemployed, married, and has completed
some college. She resides in a metro area in the Southern Atlantic region, and has a
household net worth of $250,000. Her business is in construction and residential
remodeling. She started the business to make money and to take advantage of an
opportunity, and because it was a low cost opportunity. The biggest problems she faced
starting the business were acquiring financing, and time management (six individuals
reside in her household). She made $50,000 in revenue her first year of operations, and
paid $40,000 in expenses.
Respondent 51669. Male, age 45-49, married, and has a postgraduate education.
He lives in a rural area in the Southern Atlantic region and has a net worth of $58,000.
His business is in scientific and technical services. He started the business to be his own
boss. The greatest problem he faced was advertising and marketing. His revenues went
from $1,000 to $10,000 between years one and two of operations.
Respondent 50320. Female, age 60-64, employed part time, married, and has a
Bachelors degree. She resides in a metro area in the Pacific region, has a personal income
of $22,000 and a net worth of $40,000. Her business is in janitorial services. She started
the business to make money, and because she is retired. She also saw a high demand for
the service and she has a passion for it. The greatest difficult she had while starting the
business was for an unidentified personal reason. She made $3,600 in revenue during her
first year.
Respondent 50745. Female, age 30-34, married, and has completed some college.
She resides in the middle Atlantic region and has a net worth of $52,000. She started a
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bookstore. Her motivation was that she believes in the value of work and feels that
business is important. She had vast resources and material to start the business, and
otherwise low cost access to supplies and materials. She said she had no problems
starting the business. Her revenues during the first four years of operation were $5,000;
$2,000; $18,000; and $10,000.
Respondent 50396. Male, age 60-64, employed, single, and has completed some
college. He resides in a metro area in the Eastern, North Central region, and has a net
worth of $250,000. His business is providing services to the elderly. He started the
business to earn income in retirement, and because he saw high demand for the service
and he wanted to be his own boss. The greatest problem he faced was marketing to
customers. He made $4,000 in revenue during his first year of operations.
Respondent 50477. Male, age 55-59, employed, married, and has a postgraduate
degree (Masters or beyond). He resides in a metro area in the South Atlantic region, and
has a net income of $125,000 and a net worth of $250,000. His business is executive
search consulting. He started the business to be his own boss, to make money, and
because he was encouraged to do so by his connections in industry. He also has a passion
for the work. The greatest problem he faced was transportation. He made $60,000 in
revenue, and paid $45,000 in expenses his first year of operations. In year two he made
$80,000 in revenue and paid $46,600 in expenses.
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Discussion
As with the macro-financers in Chapter 3, there is no typical non-financer.
Nascent entrepreneurs that do not use money to start their businesses give many reasons
for why they entered into entrepreneurship. They also face many kinds of problems; the
types of businesses created vary from one to the next; as do the personal characteristics of
the individuals starting them. While a greater proportion of successful, non-financed
businesses are home-based compared to the entire population of entrepreneurs (50%
compared to 25%), one would be hard-pressed to label all 17 of these ventures as
mundane or routine. Some are quickly making upwards of $80,000 using only prior
knowledge and resources already accumulated. When looking at these firms and the
individual that start them in more detail, effectuation and bricolage strategies seem to
emerge.
The Knightian view of risk-bearing is not to be totally abandoned, however. Nonfinancers disengage at high rates (up to 60%), and start new firms at low rates (9%).
Personal investments of capital, from the entrepreneur‟s savings, credit card, or other
internally generated source, are associated with a higher likelihood of starting new firms.
Nascent entrepreneurs do shoulder much of the early risk associated with the start-up
process.
Despite the heterogeneity found among non-financing nascent entrepreneurs,
there are some commonalities. Non-financers are likely to be in metro areas, have a postgraduate level education, and also to have been a part of two or more prior start-ups.
Human and social capital, therefore, are important substitutes for a lack of financial
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capital (Chandler & Hanks, 1998). Among the 17 new firms in the non-financing group, a
few are individuals pursuing consulting careers after retirement. This also explains the
educational background and need to be near customers and the market (i.e., in metro
areas). Given the variation among both successful and unsuccessful non-financers, a
cluster analysis might reveal more similarities and differences within this group, and
among the macro-financing and average-financing groups. Based on the analysis in this
chapter I surmise that likely candidates for clusters are retirees, and individuals with
high-human capital and experience.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Implications for Policymakers
The findings in this dissertation have important implications for policymakers.
The majority of nascent entrepreneurial activity in the United States is self-financed.
Over 90% of nascent entrepreneurs use some form of personal money to finance their
start-ups (e.g., personal savings, credit cards), and two-thirds use only personal money,
with no external financing whatsoever. Public policy must differ depending on whether
self-financing is a choice or the result of barriers to capital. This dissertation finds that the
odds of women acquiring formal financing are 44.5% less than for males; and that
minorities are three times more likely than non-minorities to use informal sources over
formal sources. These findings indicate that barriers to capital exist for certain
demographics during the start-up‟s early, gestation phase. This is supported by extant
literature that finds the same is true for entrepreneurs that have already established a
business. It might be assumed that self-financing is likely to be a choice among macrofinancers. Wealthy individuals may choose to avoid the time and effort that goes into
procuring outside financing, or they may wish to maintain control of the firm. While a
nominally significant proportion of the macro-financers are retirees or high net worth
individuals, recall respondent 50095 from the PSED II (a non-financer, her case is
presented in Chapter Four). She has a large household net worth, and her opportunity is
low cost. Yet she states that the biggest problem she faces is financing. Policies that
assume personal financing is a choice may result in many nascent entrepreneurs being
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forced to put more of their personal assets at risk than might otherwise be necessary,
which can hinder the growth of the new firm or lead to disengagement.
The findings in this dissertation also inform a growing tension between two
groups: those that view entrepreneurship as the creation of high-impact, gazelle firms;
and those that view entrepreneurship as the providence of all society and a means by
which individuals can improve their economic circumstances (Crawford, 2011). The
question becomes whether government should try to pick winners, or act as referee and
ensure everyone has equal access to the resources necessary to start a business. “Picking
winners” is policy prescription that directly promotes technologies and industries
believed to have the highest potential for creating jobs and adding to the GDP.
Prescriptive policies depend on scientific knowledge to inform one course of action over
another. Government investment in research and development in information and
communication technologies throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s is an example of
the successful support of a target industry (Marich, 2010).
Alternatively, policies that aim to provide equal opportunity across society can
address resource constraints faced by nascent entrepreneurs. Redlining – the act of
denying banking services to certain regions or neighborhoods based on race and
socioeconomic demographics – is illegal in the United States. However, I find that
minorities in the PSED II rarely use formal sources of financing. And, they are more
likely to use informal sources over formal sources compared to non-minorities. These
findings echo other studies showing that small businesses in minority neighborhoods
receive fewer loans (Immergluck, 2002). Stringent penalties enforced by the FDIC
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(having the power to terminate the status of an insured bank) can deter the practice of
redlining.
Arguments against policies that encourage picking winners cite massive
productivity differences between similar firms, even within narrow industry
classifications (Kerr & Nanda, 2010; Syverson, Haltiwanger, & Foster, 2008). Firm
specific forces explain a significant amount of the variation in productivity growth and
decline. I find the same to be true with nascent entrepreneurs. Personal characteristics
drive much of the variation in outcomes across the PSED II sample. Among macrofinanced nascent ventures, firm characteristics drive the variation. Also, in addition to the
many idiosyncratic factors that determine growth and survival, my findings (and those of
extant research) show that the choice of individuals to become entrepreneurs is not
always financial in nature (Kerr & Nanda, 2010). Under such conditions, it may be
impossible to create policies that target a specific group of individuals.
These same idiosyncratic characteristics, among firms and individuals, are also
present when the government acts as referee. For example, a 1987 tax reform in Denmark
that increased the cost of external financing also caused a 40% decrease in the rate of
entry into entrepreneurship. However, the decrease was attributed to low entrepreneurial
ability, and not financial constraints (Nanda, 2008). Larger institutional effects can also
limit a policy‟s effectiveness. In China and India, banking authorities heavily regulate
informal financing in an effort to increase the availability of money from more visible
microfinance institutions (Tsai, 2004). However, limited access to formal credit, political
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segmentation of markets, and other institutional weaknesses limit the effect these policies
have on low-income entrepreneurs (2004).
The answer to whether government should pick winners or act as referee is likely
somewhere in between. But, it requires differentiating between nascent industries,
nascent firms, and nascent entrepreneurs. Picking winners has been successful when
applied to nascent industries, but at the level of the individual, policies that ensure equal
access to the resources necessary to create a new firm may be more successful. The
White House recently released a fact sheet on its “Startup America” initiative, designed
to encourage high-growth entrepreneurship across the United States. The principal goal is
to create jobs and bring innovations to market in key industries such as clean energy,
medicine, advanced manufacturing, and information technology (2011). The following
are the principal commitments of the Obama Administration‟s entrepreneurship policy as
listed on the White House fact sheet, along with recommendations based on the findings
in this dissertation, and extant research.
Expanding Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs. The Small Business
Administration (SBA) will match private sector investment in promising, high-growth
companies. The $2 billion investment fund is divided into: (1) $1 billion to match private
capital 2:1 on investments in growth companies located in distressed areas; and (2) a $1
billion “Innovation Fund” to match, 1:1, private capital raised by early stage, high-growth
companies. While government support for promising industries has been successful in the
past, this particular policy focuses on the firm level without, which may prove
problematic. I find that among new firms in the PSED II, macro-financers and non-
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financers are starting new firms at the same rate. Also, a higher percentage of macrofinancers are still trying after five years in the process of creating a new firm, compared
to average- and non-financers that either start new firms or exit. A possible reason that
many venture backed investments fail is because the vast amounts of money are used to
grow the business before a proper business model has been discovered (Wilson, 2007).
This would explain why so many macro-financed firms remain in-process. For truly
resource constrained start-ups, the reverse is true – they do not have the money to pursue
a different business model should the first one fail (2007). This situation reflects the
“resource matching” problem I discuss in this dissertation, where the true risk of
entrepreneurship is in matching the right resources to the right opportunity. The $2 billion
fund may be more successful by taking this into account.
Simplify Rules for $5 Billion in Tax Credits for Private Investment in LowerIncome Communities. The Treasury Department will reform the “New Markets Tax
Credit” to simplify attracting investment in start-ups in low-income communities. I find
that nascent entrepreneurs starting new firms use more money than those that disengage.
But, those that quit might quit for reasons other than money (in fact, most quit for
personal reasons). It is not money itself that increases the odds of getting into business,
but good opportunities attract money and bad opportunities do not. Therefore, rule
simplifications should be targeted so that they allow better opportunities to be identified,
more quickly.
Connecting Mentors and Entrepreneurs. The SBA and Department of Energy will
fund a private mentorship program aimed specifically at clean tech startups. The program
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will take place in four business accelerators that provide intensive mentorship from
seasoned entrepreneurs to the most promising new companies previously funded by the
Department of Energy. Also, the Department of Veterans Affairs will launch two
accelerators focused on helping Veterans start new businesses, in any industry. While I
find that, overall, experience among nascent entrepreneurs is not an indicator of whether
a new firm is created; it is a significant factor among entrepreneurs that use little to no
financing. I surmise that experience is also a significant factor for successful macrofinancers. They should be able to find an appropriate business model sooner. Targeted
mentorship that focuses on implementing the right business model, quickly, should lead
to more new firms.
Making Government Work for Entrepreneurs. President Obama issued an
Executive Order to federal agencies to identify and eliminate or reduce processes that are
overly cumbersome to entrepreneurs. I find that entrepreneurs bear the initial risk and
uncertainty associated with starting a business, so any policy that reduces the amount of
time it takes to create a new firm, or get a product to market, should alleviate some of the
burden. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office is also giving entrepreneurs greater control
over the application process, which will allow entrepreneurs to request prioritized
examination.
Inspiring the Next Generation of Entrepreneurs. A number of programs will be
supported that provide tools and guidance to students testing ideas in high-potential,
emerging industries, as well as in marketing, design, and the arts. One of the principal
findings in this dissertation is that there is no one type of entrepreneur. Extant research
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also questions the possibility of selecting highly successful businesses ex ante (Kerr &
Nanda, 2009). Therefore, it is good practice to design policy to encourage the creation
and growth of new ventures in all industries, not only those with a (potentially) higher
probability of creating jobs.
This dissertation‟s findings also have implications for private providers of capital,
such as banks. Prior literature on personal assets and entrepreneurship finds that people
with more assets are more likely to be self-employed, and that windfall gains (e.g.,
inheritance, lottery winnings) increase the likelihood of success (Evans & Jovanovic,
1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996). However, I find
that as net worth increases, the likelihood of starting a new firm is the same as the
likelihood of disengaging. Whether disengaging leads to default on a bank loan, I am
unable to determine from the PSED II sample. If rates of disengagement are correlated to
rates of default, then the more banks can develop a personal relationship with borrowers,
the better.
Bankers, and other financiers, should pay particular attention to both the business
model, and the growth aspirations of the nascent entrepreneur. I find that nascent
entrepreneurs desiring to grow a firm as large as possible are much less likely to create a
new firm. The amount and type of resources available to the entrepreneur need to match
the business model, particularly the likelihood of the model‟s success and the amount of
time that it will take to bring the product or service to market. A disconnect between
financing and the business model is an indicator of future disengagement.
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Implications for Nascent Entrepreneurs
In 2008, the S&P 500 (the stock market index used as a measure of overall stock
prices) fell from approximately 1,400 to a 13-year low of 676.53; and at the same time,
commitments to venture capital partnerships dropped to around $25 billion, or 17% of
stock market capitalization (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010). Also, between 2004 and 2008 the
number of IPOs dropped to below 50 per year, compared to 150 in prior years (2010). For
the nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II sample, direct impacts of this drought in VC and
IPO activity are unlikely. Less than half of one percent of all start-ups even receives
venture capital in a given year, and as the PSED II is a representative sample only two
cases report any venture capital financing.
However, 25% of nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II list their primary
residence as the location of the nascent venture. The drop in housing prices and home
foreclosures may have affected the ability of these individuals to start a business. With
lower housing prices comes lower net worth (the home typically being the primary asset).
Low net worth, combined with banks reluctant (or unable) to make loans may adversely
affect a nascent entrepreneur‟s ability to acquire financial resources. Analyzing the
availability of bank financing, over time, for emerging ventures using the PSED II may
not yield the most accurate results given the nature of the sample. These are individuals
in the process of starting a venture, so many of the respondents may have already
acquired money from banks prior to the first interview. Also, it is expected that the
average amount of money acquired from banks will drop over time as individuals already
acquiring bank financing are less likely to return and ask for more. Nonetheless, I did add
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the total amount of financing acquired by all respondents, for each year between 2005
and 2010. I also added the amount of bank financing (either in the form of loans or a
bank line of credit) for each year. Table 5.1 depicts these amounts. The average amount
of overall financing acquired by respondents steadily rises with each 12-month follow-up
interview. The average amount of money acquired from banks rises until 2007-2008, and
then drops significantly between 2008 and 2010. However, it is difficult to determine
whether this trend reflects macroeconomic trends. Note the spike in bank financing
between Wave B and Wave C – from an average of $74,791 to $251,119. This may
indicate that nascent entrepreneurs, on average, acquire bank financing 2 to 3 years into
the creation of the business, with only a few returning to the bank for more loans or lines
of credit.

Wave A
2005-2006

Wave B
2006-2007

Wave C
2007-2008

Wave D
2008-2009

Wave E
2009-2010

All Financing
Total $62,824,732

$65,176,409

$61,937,075

$55,587,480

$56,965,100

Avg.

$125,339

$ 172,047

$215,455

$248,755

Bank Financing
Total $5,671,900

$2,841,588

$7,579,000

$2,018,423

$3,566,400

Avg.

$74,791

$251,753

$189,119

$133,566

$62,761

$25,168

Table 5.1 : Amount of Financing Acquired, By Year (All Sources and Bank Only)

The findings in this dissertation indicate that the standard financing narrative of
“friends, family, and fools” is not accurate. Over 92% of nascent entrepreneurs use their
own money (84%, if only considering personal savings used prior to formal firm
registration), while 18.8% acquire money from relatives, 17% use a credit card, and 12%
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use bank loans. Only 6.4% of nascent entrepreneurs used money acquired from friends or
work colleagues. Based on these findings, as well as conversations with entrepreneurs
who I invite to speak to my students (see the anecdote at the start of Chapter 1), the
principal source of start-up financing is going to be the founder‟s personal savings, and
possibly credit cards. Nascent entrepreneurs should be fully prepared to bear the initial
financial risk. Even a high-potential, valuable opportunity can fail to attract outside
capital if the entrepreneur does not risk his or her own money up front. Investors want to
see that the entrepreneur is committed to seeing the idea through to market. Personal
financing is an important way to signal this commitment.
Nascent entrepreneurs should also scrutinize their own growth aspirations. I find
that growth expectations are inversely related to the likelihood of success. Other studies
find the same relationship between growth and the acquisition of external funds (Gartner,
et al., In Press). Growth takes time. If the entrepreneur does not have the financing to
sustain long periods of negative cash flow, the venture is likely to fail.
While the importance of financing should not be underestimated, nascent
entrepreneurs who are just starting out should understand that the primary reasons for
disengagement from the start-up process are personal in nature. Only 12% in the United
States disengaged due to a lack of financing; 38% disengaged for health or family
reasons.
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Implications for Researchers
The study of nascent entrepreneurs is essentially the study of the creation of
organizations.

This

dissertation

shows

that

organizational,

management,

and

entrepreneurship scholars concerned with the earliest stages of firm creation need to pay
close attention not only to aspects of the environment and the firm, but also to the
thoughts, characteristics, and actions of the founder. While this dissertation find
entrepreneurs and the firms they create to vary both within and between different
categorizations, certain people have easier access to resources such as financing, location,
and social capital.
Theoretical perspectives on risk and information asymmetries ultimately reflect
differing ideas on the role of the entrepreneur in the economy. Schumpeterian
entrepreneurs are innovators, while Knightian entrepreneurs are residual claimants (i.e.,
business owners) who bear uncertainty and insure the financier. For Kirzner and the
Austrian school, alertness to market disequilibrium is the hallmark of the entrepreneur
(Kirzner, 1978, 1997). According to Shane and Venkataraman, entrepreneurship is the
discovery and evaluation of opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). One of the
principal findings of this dissertation – that the risk of disengagement is more closely
associated with the entrepreneur‟s personal life – supports a stream of research that
explores risk as a multidimensional construct, where risk differs across individuals and
situations (Miller, 2007). Given that 38% of nascent entrepreneurs in the U.S. are
disengaging for personal, health, and family reasons, research investigating the risks of
entrepreneurship should take into account these determinants. When designing constructs
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it is also necessary to gauge the entrepreneur‟s level of awareness that these determinants
may affect outcomes.
The negative relationship between growth intentions and new firm creation is an
indication that risk constructs should also measure resource matching – proper
exploitation of the opportunity (i.e., the right business model) to the right types and
amounts of critical resources. Also, based on the finding that minorities are more likely to
use informal sources of financing compared to formal sources, researchers should
consider how formal and informal institutions interact with personal characteristics to
affect financing outcomes. For example, research on the solar energy sector finds that
state-sponsored incentives, as well as shared social norms of family interdependence, are
related to new firm entry into the sector (Meek, Pacheco, & York, 2010).
Recall discussions about the entrepreneur‟s perceptions of financing as the
principal problem. Among nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II, 28% said the main
problem they faced was acquiring financing, and a further 11.2% said the main problem
was keeping costs down. Yet, at the moment of actual disengagement only 12.3% said
financing problems were the reason for quitting. Of the 273 nascent entrepreneurs in the
PSED II sample that stated financing as the main problem in starting a business, 119
(45%) disengage from the process at some point in the subsequent four years.
Organizational outcomes (e.g., the creation of a new firm or improved performance) may
be predicted by the entrepreneur‟s perceptions early in the process.
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Limitations
The heterogeneity of the PSED II sample reveals the variation underlying the
creation of new businesses. This dissertation‟s examination of outlier nascent
entrepreneurs – the macro-financers and non-financers – depicts many types of firms
started by people from a multitude of socioeconomic backgrounds. It was my intention to
uncover commonalities among successful entrepreneurs in each outlier group, using a
non-distributional approach similar to recent research on firm performance. However,
given the variation among both successful and unsuccessful nascent ventures, a cluster
analysis might better reveal commonalities and differences among different
categorizations. Successful macro-financed new firms are rare events, and very few are
represented in the sample. An oversampling of these firms, drawing from high-growth
industries, would have improved the analyses in this dissertation. I am aware of only one
national sample that includes an oversampling of high-potential firms, and that is the
CAUSEE study administered by the Queensland University of Technology in Australia.
Defining a successful outcome is subject to debate. The PSED II defines a new
firm as one that has achieved positive monthly cash flow for at least 6 out of 12 months
in the year preceding the interview. In reality, there are a number of firms that by any
other definition could be considered successful. Consider Amazon which did not make
money during its initial years. It may be that a percentage of the “still trying” nascent
entrepreneurs in the PSED II are already affecting prices and quantities in the market.
From a public policy perspective, a successful start-up is one that generates jobs or
commercializes new technologies. The PSED II is made up predominantly of home-
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based, sole-proprietorships. This is due to the representative nature of the sample, which
again is great for generalizability of results, but can make it difficult to examine the startup process from a policy perspective.
Common methods bias is a potential limitation of this study. Systemic error
variance from measurement items in the survey (e.g., item T1 asking about the size of the
business) can bias research findings when the variance either inflates or deflates the true
nature of the construct of interest (e.g., the true size of the firm) (Doty & Glick, 1998). In
this dissertation, I incorporate variables utilized by other PSED scholars, and I check for
partial correlation in each model (Meade, Watson, & Kroustalis, 2007). Nevertheless, the
measures in the PSED are self-reported. In fact, a number of respondents indicate that
they enjoyed and learned from the process of answering the phone interviewers‟
questions. These respondents were more excited than before to start a business. When
asked why, many respondents said that many of the questionnaire items got them
thinking about start-up issues that they had never thought about. Others said that they felt
validated. Keep in mind that each interview took well over an hour to complete. Doty and
Glick (1998) suggest a meta-analysis to properly assess this level of bias. From other
studies using multiple traits (i.e., firm and individual characteristics), one could gather the
estimates from the correlation matrices, and discrepancies between observed and true
relationships would be defined as a function of the concreteness of individual constructs
(1998).
It is not clear that the pecking-order theory of financing reflects a planned strategy
on the part of the entrepreneur, or if individuals are simply using resources that are easy
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to acquire. Future research in this area might control for the value of the opportunity to
see whether this has an effect on attracting external financing, especially formal financing
from banks and investors. Also, my empirical investigation of pecking order theory tests
what types of financing are used throughout the process, by sample wave. It does not
specifically test when financing occurs. Event history analysis could investigate the
sequence of financing in the context of other start-up activities.
In the end, the use of financing as a variable is noisy. Some entrepreneurs seek
financing when they don‟t need it, and those efforts can distract from spending time on
more critical aspects of the venture. Other entrepreneurs do not devote enough attention
to financing, or underestimate what they need. As Gartner, et al. point out (In Press),
nascent entrepreneurs may do a poor job accurately assessing the viability and value of
opportunities they pursue. Nascent entrepreneurs also may not accurately perceive their
own abilities, or the types of risks they face (Baron, 2007).

Future Research
Future research on entrepreneurial risk as it relates to financing might investigate
more robust constructs that capture multiple dimensions of risk. If measures of Knightian
risk (e.g., occupational choice) are correlated with Schumpeterian concepts (e.g., factors
related to the successful commercialization of innovations); then policies promoting one
form of entrepreneurship should promote the other. Promoting self-employment across
society may also drive overall innovation in the economy.
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Further investigation of the macro-financers “still trying” after five years in
process would answer questions on the role of wealth and new venture creation. These
macro-financers do not seem to be implementing more complex business models. Are
they working on the start-up for so long because an escalation of commitment makes it
difficult to disengage? Is the sunk cost too much to bear? Could it be that large amounts
of financing allow entrepreneurs to experiment more, until they get it “just right”?
Alternatively, are these individuals just dabbling in entrepreneurship, enjoying the
process (perhaps as a hobby), having no clear goal in mind? More research assessing the
value of the opportunities pursued, and the entrepreneur‟s intentions, is needed to answer
these questions.
To compare the three groups of financers in the PSED II, ANOVA can be used
(or its non-parametric equivalents) to test how the non-financers and macro-financers
differ from one another, and from average-financers – and to test for success and failure
rates between each group. Since ANOVA assumes that the dependent variable is interval
in nature (categories are ordered and evenly spaced), a Kruskal-Wallis test can
investigate outcomes among each group. Wilcox tests can look at unique variables that
prior research considers to be associated with high-potential firms, one by one, to see if
they explain variance within the financing groups. These variables include whether patent
applications have been filed, education levels, and industry expertise. Reynolds and
Curtin (2008) identify a small proportion of firms in the PSED II that expected to
generate a lot of income and create a lot of jobs. These high-potential nascent ventures
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are defined as providing over 50 jobs, or generating $4 million in annual sales at the end
of the first five years as a new firm.
Empirically testing when in the process nascent entrepreneurs received or put in
money is a further avenue of research. First, event history analysis can reveal if people
using little money do so because they disengage early, and why they disengage (e.g., the
opportunity is low-value, health problems, resource constraints). A multi-level growth
modeling approach could take this a step further. First, the individual start-up activities in
the PSED II can be plotted on a graph, showing when each activity was completed over
the length of the entire process. These individual “growth” trajectories can then be
examined to detect overall trends within the sample. The analysis would reveal which
activities take place first, and which take place later in the process. These trajectories can
also be examined to reveal differences between individual cases, revealing what types of
nascent entrepreneurs follow which type of sequence.

Conclusions
Chapter 1 investigated whether money matters for getting into business. Nascent
entrepreneurs that start new firms use more money than those that disengage from the
process. However, money alone does not improve the odds of success. It is likely that
successful nascent entrepreneurs are better judges of their own capabilities, and therefore
match their resources (internal or acquired) to the opportunity pursued. Good money
attracts good opportunities. That high growth aspirations are negatively correlated to the
creation of new firms seems to support this notion. Also, a high percentage of macro-
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financers (i.e., individuals using more than $230,000 to start a new venture) work on their
start-ups for longer periods of time. Non-financers disengage from the process at higher
rates. This is an indication that nascent entrepreneurs that do realize the opportunity they
are pursuing is out of reach (or low in value) disengage before committing more
resources. Future research in this area must control for the value of the opportunity
pursued to determine the extent this is indeed the case.
Nascent entrepreneurs predominantly disengage for personal reasons that have
nothing to do with financial resources. Researchers investigating organizational creation
should ensure that measures relating to risk reflect the multidimensionality of the
construct. That is, risk is not just a cost-benefit analysis that compares wage work to
entrepreneurship, nor is it solely an assessment of an opportunity‟s value and whether the
entrepreneur‟s skills and knowledge are sufficient to exploit it.
Chapter 2 investigated whether nascent entrepreneurs follow a pattern when
acquiring specific sources of financing. Over 90% of all nascent entrepreneurs use
personal money to finance their start-ups, and two-thirds use only personal money.
Financing from banks and other external sources tends to come later in the process of
creating a new venture, if at all. Researchers and policymakers should consider whether
the sequential nature of financing reveals the nascent entrepreneur‟s choice, or the
presence of barriers to capital acquisition. The analysis in this chapter shows that females
and minorities are much less likely than males and non-minorities to acquire formal
sources of financing, such as from banks or professional investors.
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Chapters 3 and 4 examined two outlier groups of nascent entrepreneurs in more
detail – non-financers that use little to no money, and macro-financers that use vast
amounts of money. Macro-financers are not readily identifiable based on personal
characteristics. Hence, attempts at targeting certain types of people to create high-growth
ventures are not likely to be successful. Targeting industries or regions is more likely to
lead to the creation of high-impact firms. And, these efforts should be combined with
measures to ensure equal opportunities for all to access external financing. Statistically,
non-financers also vary widely by demographics, socioeconomic backgrounds, and the
types of businesses created. Nominally, however, non-financers are commonly found in
metro areas, have a post-graduate level education, and have started at least two prior
start-ups. This supports prior research findings showing that human and social capital can
act as substitutes for a lack of financial capital.
Nascent entrepreneurship is a story of variation, not of averages and means. Many
types of people start many types of firms. Nascent entrepreneurship is also a story of
perceived risk, opportunity, and personal capabilities. Some use more resources than is
necessary, while others do not use enough. Future research in entrepreneurial finance and
resource acquisition must account for the non-distributional nature of the phenomenon to
answer questions related to process outcomes of resource-rich and resource-poor
entrepreneurs. It must also consider how formal institutions (e.g., laws and policy) and
informal institutions (e.g., social mores and norms) interact with the personal
characteristics of people creating new ventures.
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Appendix A
PSED II Research Program

This appendix details the PSED research program‟s rationale and design. The
information in this section is based entirely on documentation available from the Panel
Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics website, hosted by the University of Michigan
Institute for Social Research: http://www.psed.isr.umich.edu/psed/home.

Program Rationale and Description
The principal contribution of the PSED research program is the advancement of
scholarly understanding of the firm creation process (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007b). The
PSED II includes a wide range of independent variables that tracks initiatives of nascent
entrepreneurs from inception to the early years of an operation new firm (2007b).
Another contribution is the generalizability of the data, “Because the PSED II cohort
represents all business start-up activity in the US, inferences about the entire population
of 12 million nascent entrepreneurs that are creating 7 million nascent enterprises are
justified.” (2007b). Reynolds and Curtin (2007b) further explain:

Only one extant research program, the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
provides detailed information on a representative national sample involved in the
firm creation process. The PSED research program provides data describing the
start-up phase of the business dynamic processes…[it is] the basis for three types
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of analysis: (1) what types of individuals and teams enter the firm start-up
process; (2) what happens during the start-up process; and (3) what features of the
individuals (or teams) and their activity are associated with different outcomes –
new firm, disengagement, or continuation of the start-up effort.

Project Design
The overall research design assumes that individuals transition into nascent
entrepreneurship when they begin to take some action to create a new firm. Nascent
entrepreneurs are drawn from the adult population as independent nascent entrepreneurs
– or if from an existing business, as nascent “intrapreneurs” (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008).
The second transition will either be the creation of a new firm, or disengagement. A new
firm is defined as an independent commercial actor in the economy, affecting the prices
and quantities of goods traded in the market (2008). The specifics of the research design
for the screening questions, and the first two waves of the detailed interviews, are
described by Reynolds and Curtin (2007b, 2008) below:

The research procedure consists of three phases. The first is identifying a
representative sample of those actively involved in the new firm creation process,
the nascent entrepreneurs. They are identified from phone interviews completed
with adults from a representative sample of households that meet four criteria: 1)
they consider themselves as involved in the firm creation process, 2) they have
engaged in some start-up activity in the past 12 months, 3) they expect to own all
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or part of the new firm, and 4) the initiative has not progressed to the point it may
be considered an operating business. For PSED II, 31,845 individuals were
screened to locate 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs from October 2005 to January
2006; the average time required for this screening module was 2 minutes. These
nascent entrepreneurs represent 12 million individuals between the ages of 18 and
74 years old.
The second phase involved the completion of a 60 minute phone interview
that covers a wide range of topics related to the initiation of a new firm. While the
screening was completed by a commercial survey firm, the detailed data is
collected by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. The topics
covered are summarized in the “Wave A” column in [Table A-1]…
…The third phase involved the follow-up phone interviews, also about 60
minutes long. Careful scheduling has allowed the initial contact for the first
follow-up to occur 52 weeks following completion of the initial detailed
interview, the second follow-up 104 weeks, and so forth. The topics of the
interview are listed in the “Wave B” column in [Table A-1] and vary depending
on the status of the initiative at the time of the follow-up. Those nascent
entrepreneurs that report they have disengaged from the initiative (quit) receive a
few questions about start-up activity and a few items about the reasons for their
decision. All others receive most of the same interview schedule provided in the
first interview, which provides them with a chance to update their case file with
reports of new activity or changes in the start-up team or financial structure.
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Topic Modules

Screen

Screening questions
Assessment of criteria for nascent entrepreneur
Socio-demographic

Wave
A

Wave B
(1,2)

Wave C
(1,2)

All
All
All

A.1: Why involved, business opportunity (open ended)
All
A.2: Confirm same business activity
All
All
A.3: Determine status: new firm, quit, continue
All
All
B: Type of business, location
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
C: Legal form
All
All
All
D: Start-up activities
All
All
All
E.1: Start-up finances, entry into firm registries (3)
All
All
All
E.2: Confirm quit, exit interview
Quits
Quits
F: Orientations toward competition
All
NF
NF
G: Owners, key non-owners, & helpers inventory
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
H: Owner demographics
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
J: Relationships among owners
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
K: Juristic (legal entity) owners
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
M: Key non-owner demographics
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
N: Helper demographics
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
P: Community resources, support for new firms
All
NF
NF
Q: Informal start-up financial support
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
R: Legal entity start-up investments, debts, net worth
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
S: Competitive strategy and target markets
All
NF
NF
T: Growth expectations
All
NF
NF
U.1: Respondent’s motivation
All
U.2: Employment structure (3)
NF
NF
V.1: Expense structure: summary (3)
NF
V.2: Expense structure: detailed (3)
NF
X: Respondent’s career background
All
SU
SU
Y: Respondent’s self-descriptions
All
Z: Respondent & household socio-demographics
All
NF,SU
NF,SU
NOTES: (1) After wave A, modules are provided to All respondents, only those that Quit, or
those with a new firm (NF), or still active in the start-up process (SU).
(2) After initial interview, modules are repeated to capture changes or new information about
the activity or details on the current status.
(3) Based on Kauffman Firm Survey interview schedule (Mathematical Policy Research, 2007).

Table A-1 : Overview of Interview Schedule Modules (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007b)
Outcomes of Nascent Entrepreneurship
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The nascent entrepreneur‟s efforts to create a business will result in one of three
outcomes: (1) a new firm; (2) continuation of the process; or (3) disengagement from the
process. In order to be considered a “new firm”, each of the following three conditions
must be met (item numbers from questionnaire included):

1.

(A30) Has this business received any money, income, or fees from the sale of
goods or services for more than six of the past twelve months?

2. (A32) Has the monthly revenue been more than the monthly expenses for more
than six of the past twelve months?
3. (A34) Were salaries or wages of the owners who were active in managing the
business included in the monthly expenses for more than six of the past twelve
months?

Finally, the respondent has to answer yes to the following (A41): “It would appear
that you are an operating business – one with sales and revenue greater than the ongoing
expenses including salaries. Would you agree with this description of the current
business?”
A nascent entrepreneur is considered “still trying” if he or she did not meet the
criteria of a new firm, and if one of the following three conditions is met:
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1. Answers “yes” to both:
a. (A37) In the past twelve months, since the first interview, have you
devoted more than 160 hours – 4 weeks of full time work – to this
business start-up?
b. (A38) Over the next six months, do you expect to spend more than 80
hours – 2 weeks of full time work – on this business start-up?
2. Answers “no” or “I don‟t know” to either A37 or A38 above, and “yes” to:
a. (A40) Do you consider this business start-up to be a major focus of your
work career over the next twelve months?
3. Answers “no” to A41, and “actively involved” to:
a. (A42) Do you consider yourself to be actively involved with the new
business start-up, or disengaged from it?

A nascent entrepreneur is considered to have “disengage” if for either item A15,
or A42, the he or she indicates disengagement from the original business effort.
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